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Parental Rights and Family Integrity:
Forgotten Victims in the Battle Against
Child Abuse
Part I: Introduction
Reverend and Mrs. Fowler and two of their children, Frank
and Ligia, ages eleven and six respectively, left their home on
the evening of March 8, 1993, to attend choir practice at their
Plattsburgh, New York church. Frank, already upset about not
being allowed to go to a basketball game with his older sister
that evening because of his display of hyperactive behavior that
afternoon, began to throw a temper tantrum in the car. He ver-
bally abused his parents, and refused to wear his seatbelt, while
screaming and kicking the back of his father's seat.' After tell-
ing him numerous times to calm down, Reverend Fowler
stopped the car, and opened the back door, at which point Frank
began kicking him while he attempted to fasten his seat belt.2
After slapping Frank twice on the leg to no avail, Reverend
Fowler finally slapped him on the right side of his face. Frank
sat up and put on his seat belt, and the family proceeded to
choir practice. 3
The school nurse heard from one of Frank's friends that he
was out of school for four days because of a bruise on his face
caused by his father. The nurse called the New York State
1. See Fowler v. Robinson, No. 94 - CV - 836, 1996 WL 67994, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 15, 1996).
2. See id.
3. See id.
1
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Central Register of Child Abuse and Mistreatment. 4 This gen-
erated a hot line report to the Clinton County Department of
Social Services which started an investigation of suspected
child abuse.5
4. See id. at *2. New York Social Service Law requires mandatory reporting
for certain individuals. Section 413 of the New York Social Service Law provides
in part:
The following persons and officials are required to report or cause a report to
be made in accordance with this title when they have reasonable cause to
suspect that a child coming before them in their professional or official ca-
pacity is an abused or maltreated child, or when they have reasonable cause
to suspect that a child is an abused or maltreated child where the parent,
guardian, custodian or other person legally responsible for such child comes
before them in their professional or official capacity and states from per-
sonal knowledge, facts, conditions or circumstances which, if correct, would
render the child an abused or maltreated child: any physician; registered
physician assistant; surgeon; medical examiner; coroner; dentist; dental hy-
gienist; osteopath; optometrist; chiropractor; podiatrist; resident; intern;
psychologist; registered nurse; hospital personnel engaged in the admission,
examination, care or treatment of persons; a Christian Science practitioner;
school official; social services worker; day care center worker; provider of
family or group family day care; employee or volunteer in a residential care
facility defined in subdivision seven of section four hundred twelve of this
chapter or any other child care or foster care worker; mental health profes-
sional; substance abuse counselor; alcoholism counselor; peace officer; police
officer; district attorney or assistant district attorney; investigator employed
in the office of a district attorney; or other law enforcement official.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 413 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997).
5. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *2. Section 415 of the New York Social
Services Law provides in part:
Reports of suspected child abuse or maltreatment made pursuant to this
title shall be made immediately by telephone or by telephone facsimile
machine on a form supplied by the Commissioner. Oral reports shall be fol-
lowed by a report in writing within forty-eight hours after such oral report.
Oral reports shall be made to the statewide central register of child abuse
and maltreatment .... Written reports shall be made to the appropriate
local child protective service ... and shall include the following information:
the names and addresses of the child and his or her parents or other person
responsible for his or her care, if known;.., the child's age, sex and race; the
nature and extent of the child's injuries, abuse or maltreatment, including
any evidence of prior injuries, abuse or maltreatment to the child or, as the
case may be, his or her siblings; the name of the person or persons alleged to
be responsible for causing the injury, abuse or maltreatment, if known; fam-
ily composition, where appropriate; the source of the report; the person mak-
ing the report and where he or she can be reached; the actions taken by the
reporting source, including the taking of photographs and x-rays, removal or
keeping of the child or notifying the medical examiner or coroner .... Writ-
ten reports from persons or officials required by this title to report shall be
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/6
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On or about April 22, 1993, caseworkers from the Clinton
County, New York Department of Social Services had all three
Fowler children, ages eleven, eight, and six, removed from their
classrooms to a locked room. Despite Frank's request to tele-
phone his parents, the children were prevented from leaving the
locked room, and caseworkers proceeded to interrogate the chil-
dren without their parents or counsel present.6 Though the
children apparently made no accusation of child abuse during
the interview, 7 two caseworkers signed depositions charging the
father with the crime of assault in the third degree,8 and child
physical abuse.9 Reverend Fowler was arrested on April 23,
1993.10 Following the arrest, and after threatening to remove
the children, the two caseworkers allegedly coerced the parents
into signing a document in which the parents pledged that they
would not have any punitive or disciplinary physical contact
with any of their children. They also allegedly coerced Rever-
end Fowler into agreeing to attend mental health counseling for
child abuse." On July 7, 1993, Reverend Fowler was acquitted
of the criminal charge of assault in the third degree. 12
admissible in evidence in any proceedings relating to child abuse or
maltreatment.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 415 (McKinney 1992).
6. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *3.
7. See id.
8. See id. at *4.
9. See id. New York Social Services Law defines an abused child as follows:
"Abused child" means a child less than eighteen years of age whose parent
or other person legally responsible for his care
(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other
than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of
death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment
of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ, or
(ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to
such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to
cause death or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted im-
pairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of any bodily organ, or
(iii) commits, or allows to be committed, an act of sexual abuse against such
child as defined in the penal law.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371(4)(b) (McKinney 1992).
10. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *4.
11. See id.
12. See id.
3
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Reverend and Mrs. Fowler subsequently brought a section
198313 action against six employees of the Clinton County De-
partment of Social Services for "false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, denial of equal protection,
infringement of First Amendment rights, denial of due process,
denial of liberty rights, failure to intervene, supervisory liability
and failure to train and supervise."14 The district court denied
two of the defendants' motions for summary judgment for false
arrest and malicious prosecution, one defendant's motion for
summary judgment for supervisory liability and another de-
fendant's motion with respect to failure to train and supervise
caseworkers. 15 Defendants' motions for summary judgment
were granted "with respect to the plaintiffs' claims [against so-
cial services] for false imprisonment, denial of equal protection,
infringement of First Amendment rights, denial of due process
for injury to reputation, denial of liberty right for interference
with right to family integrity, and failure to intervene."16
This case is an example of the difficulty experienced when
dealing with the competing interests of "the privacy rights of
the family in the important area of child rearing" and the "obli-
gation and right of responsible government to deal effectively
with the stark reality of child abuse in our society .... -17 The
effects of the tension between these two interests and the social
policies behind them can be tragic, and often chilling, when the
13. See id. at *1. A Section 1983 suit is a civil action brought when the plain-
tiff believes that his or her Constitutional rights have been violated. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Id.
14. Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *1.
15. See id. at *19.
16. Id.
17. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 789 n.10 (10th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 18:135
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reports and/or charges filed are found to be false. 18 The problem
of providing the government enough latitude to deal effectively
with genuine child abuse, without harming innocent families, is
exaggerated when courts find that the government's obligation
is not an affirmative one.
Consider the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services,19 where the Wisconsin County De-
partment of Social Services received complaints that a child was
being abused by his custodial father.20 Although Social Services
took various steps to protect the child, they did not remove the
child from the home and place him in protective custody.21 The
father beat his son so severely that the child suffered perma-
nent brain damage leaving him profoundly retarded. 22 The
child's mother brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 She
alleged that by failing to intervene, the department had de-
prived her child of his liberty interest in bodily integrity, violat-
ing his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 The court held that there was no due process
violation because the Fourteenth Amendment "imposes no duty
on the State to provide members of the general public with ade-
quate protective services."25 With regard to the claim alleging
deprivation of liberty, the court made clear that "[wihile the
State may have been aware of the dangers that [the child]
faced, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything
to render him more vulnerable to them."26
While Fowler illustrates the unnecessary and arbitrary ac--
tions taken by social workers, DeShaney points out the need for
balance. The Fowler court recognized the potential damage so-
cial workers can cause through their authority and influence to
18. In Fowler, the Reverend's reputation in his church community was called
into question (the social workers had acquired a parishioners' list and intended to
contact various parishioners), he was arrested on false charges, while his children
were subjected to questioning about the integrity of their parents' behavior. See
Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *3-4.
19. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 193.
24. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
25. Id. at 189.
26. Id. at 190.
19971 139
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bring criminal charges. The ability to bring criminal charges
often carries the gravest consequences of any choice that child
protective services workers can make, next to depriving a par-
ent of custody.27 The government's need to provide investiga-
tory authority works in direct contrast to the manner in which
it is applied. In DeShaney, the governmental authority was
wrongfully applied through omission, and the conflict is shown
between the availability of that authority and its application in
a situation where the welfare of a child is thought to be at risk.
The misapplication of that authority in Fowler violated the par-
ents' and children's right to be "let alone," or their "family integ-
rity." Wrongfully applied governmental authority has
consistently led to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns
about the violation of family integrity.28 The focus in resolving
this dilemma, regardless of whether authority was abused,
should not just be on providing families an adequate remedy for
wrongful government intrusion, to the extent that a Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendment right has been violated. The more
pressing dilemma is how to prevent the constitutional violations
that lead to those actions. The right framework must be pro-
vided to which an agency can refer when exercising its author-
ity, rather than concentrating on justifying the result through
the granting of qualified or absolute immunity to the wandering
official. This type of "front end" approach towards balancing
governmental interest with family rights requires more than
what the courts have ultimately provided in dealing with agen-
cies' arbitrary actions. Without a definitive declaration of what
family rights are in the area of child rearing, discipline, educa-
tion, and other areas of family life that parents have tradition-
ally directed, the courts will be obliged to resort to balancing
tests and whatever "clearly established" constitutional privi-
leges have been declared when agencies decide to impose on
those traditions. Consequently, the discussion of intrusion of
family integrity contrasted with balancing state authority will
27. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *18. The Court also referred to Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 312 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which states that few
powers that the State possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, "can harm liberty as
substantially as the filing of criminal charges."
28. See Cathleen A. Cleaver, Parental Rights: Who's Children Are They? FRC
Code: PV95J1PN (Sept. 20, 1995) <http://www.frc.org/frc/perspective/
pv95j lpn.html>.
[Vol. 18:135
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ultimately focus on the need for legislative action that declares
what rights are clearly established and which should be left to
common law balancing tests.
As a foundation for this analysis of these competing inter-
ests, Part II will report on the current status of child abuse laws
and investigatory efforts.29 Part III will examine the current
view by the courts as to what kinds of violations of family or
parental rights are actionable, and the effects of not recognizing
certain traditional parental rights as "clearly established" and
fundamental in Section 1983 actions.30 Finally, Part IV will
weigh the effectiveness of the existing common law balancing
tests against the latest proposed legislative remedy as a poten-
tial solution for protecting the family without jeopardizing the
welfare of children and, at the same time, avoiding needless liti-
gation. The analysis will argue in favor of the legislative ap-
proach as the most practical and attainable means for families
to maintain their right to exercise their constitutional rights,
thereby maintaining family integrity.31
Part II: Background
As part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, Congress enacted legislation to establish an agency called
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect [hereinafter
"NCCAN"].32 The mission assigned to the NCCAN is multi-fac-
29. See infra text accompanying notes 32-88.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 89-300.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 301-377.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1994). "The Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and
Family Services Act of 1988," later amended as, "The Child Abuse, Domestic Vio-
lence, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992," see Pub. L. No. 102-295, § 102,
106 Stat. 187 (1992), and then, "The National Child Protection Act of 1993," see
Pub. L. No. 103-209, § 1, 107 Stat. 2490 (1993), amended again in 1996 to incorpo-
rate this statute along with several others to enable the NCCAN to perform sev-
eral key functions in the area of child abuse and neglect. As late as 1992, the
congressional findings under the Act included:
(1) each year, hundreds of thousands of American children are victims of
abuse and neglect with such numbers having increased dramatically
over the past decade;
(2) many of these children and their families fail to receive adequate protec-
tion or treatment;
(3) the problem of child abuse and neglect requires a comprehensive ap-
proach that-
19971 141
7
142 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:135
eted.33 Its main purpose, however, is to conduct research on the
causes, prevention and identification of child abuse and ne-
glect.34 Another function of the NCCAN is to maintain and dis-
(A) integrates the work of social service, legal health, mental health, ed-
ucation, and substance abuse agencies and organizations;
(B) strengthens coordination among all levels of government, and with
private agencies, civic, religious, and professional organizations, and
individual volunteers;
(C) emphasizes the need for abuse and neglect prevention, investiga-
tion, and treatment at the neighborhood level;
(D) ensures properly trained and support staff with specialized knowl-
edge, to carry out their child protection duties; and
(E) is sensitive to ethnic and cultural diversity;
(4) the failure to coordinate and comprehensively prevent and treat child
abuse and neglect threatens the futures of tens of thousands of children
and results in a cost to the Nation of billions of dollars in direct expendi-
tures for health, social, and special educational services and ultimately
in the loss of work productivity;
(5) all elements of American society have a shared responsibility in re-
sponding to this national child and family emergency;
(6) substantial reductions in the prevalence and incidence of child abuse
and neglect and the alleviation of its consequences are matters of the
highest national priority;
(7) national policy should strengthen families to remedy the causes of child
abuse and neglect, provide support for intensive services to prevent the
unnecessary removal of children from families, and promote the reunifi-
cation of families if removal has taken place;
(8) the child protection system should be comprehensive, child-centered,
family-focused, and community-based, should incorporate all appropri-
ate measures to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of child abuse and
neglect, and should promote physical and psychological recovery and so-
cial re-integration in an environment that fosters the health, self-re-
spect, and dignity of the child[.]
Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-295, § 102, 106 Stat. 187 (1992).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5105 provides in part:
[tihe Secretary shall, through the Center, conduct research on-
(A) the causes, prevention, identification, treatment and cultural distinc-
tions of child abuse and neglect;
(B) appropriate, effective and culturally sensitive investigative, administra-
tive, and judicial procedures with respect to cases of child abuse; and
(C) the national incidence of child abuse and neglect, including-
(i) the extent to which incidents of child abuse are increasing or de-
creasing in number and severity;
(ii) the relationship of child abuse and neglect to nonpayment of child
support, cultural diversity, disabilities, and various other factors;
and
(iii) the incidence of substantiated reported child abuse cases that re-
sult in civil child protection proceedings or criminal proceedings,
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/6
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seminate information relating to the incidence of child abuse
and neglect, as well as to identify effective prevention and treat-
ment programs implemented by the states.35 The NCCAN does
this through a national clearinghouse it has established. 36 In
April of 1996, in conjunction with the Administration on Chil-
dren, Youth and Families and the NCCAN, the Department of
Health and Human Services [hereinafter, "DHHS"] published
the results of the Third National Incidence Study of Child
Abuse and Neglect, referred to as, NIS-3. 3v The key objective
for this study was to provide an update of the status of child
abuse in the nation, and to measure any increase or decrease in
the incidence of child abuse and neglect since the last study was
performed in 1986 - 1987.38 The results published are based on
over 5,600 professionals in 842 agencies across forty-two coun-
ties participating in the study.39 The results revealed that there
has been a substantial and significant increase in the incidence
of child abuse and neglect since 1986.40
Two standards were used to categorize children in the
study: the Harm Standard41 and the Endangerment Standard. 42
including the number of such cases with respect to which the court
makes a finding that abuse or neglect exists and the disposition of
such cases.
Id. § 5105(a).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 5104(b) (1994).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 5104(a).
37. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK, PH.D. & DIANE D. BROADHURST, M.L.A., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Executive Summary of the Third National Inci-
dence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-3)(Sep. 1996). The first incidence
study (NIS-1) was conducted in 1979 and 1980 and published in 1981. The second
study (NIS-2) was conducted in 1986 and 1987 and published in 1988. The third
(NIS-3) study's data was collected in 1993 and 1994 and results were published in
1996 after two years of analysis. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See SELDAK, supra note 37 at 12. The Harm Standard considers children
to be maltreated only if they already experienced harm from abuse or neglect. See
id. at 5. The Harm Standard was used in all three national incidence studies, and
generally requires that an act or omission result in demonstrable harm. See id. at
12. According to NIS-3, an estimated 1,553,800 children in the United States were
abused or neglected under the Harm Standard in 1993. This represented a sixty-
seven percent increase since the previous study, which indicated a total of 931,000
children in 1986. See id. The categories of abused or neglected children that fit
under the Harm Standard were sexually abused, physically neglected, emotionally
neglected, and physically abused children. See id. at 13.
9
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Under the Harm Standard, the total number of abused and ne-
glected children was two-thirds higher in this study as com-
pared to the last study.43 "The 1993 estimate of the number of
children who were endangered by maltreatment (but not yet
harmed) was more than four times the 1986 estimate."44 The
conclusion was that the risk of the child experiencing harm-
causing abuse or neglect in 1993 was one and one-half times
greater than it was in 1986. 45 Overall, DHHS reported that
1,012,000 children were victims of child abuse and neglect in
1994, representing a twenty-seven percent increase since 1990,
when approximately 800,000 children were found to be victims
of maltreatment. 46
According to the NCCAN, in 1994, various State child pro-
tective agencies across the United States referred an estimated
two million reports of maltreatment for investigation.4 7 The
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System [hereinafter,
"NCANDS"]48 indicated that those reports involved approxi-
mately 2.9 million children.49 Of the reports that were substan-
tiated, fifty-three percent were due to neglect, twenty-six
percent to physical abuse, fourteen percent were associated
with sexual abuse, five percent were caused by emotional abuse
42. See Seldak, supra note 37 at 12. The Endangerment Standard, used in
both NIS-2 and NIS-3, includes all children who meet the Harm Standard but adds
others as well. It includes "children who were not yet harmed by maltreatment."
See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 14.
45. See id. at 5-6. "The term 'child abuse and neglect' means the physical or
mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment
of a child by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare, under circum-
stances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened
thereby, as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary .. " 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994). See Seldak, supra note 37 at 5-6.
46. See National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Child Abuse and
Neglect Statistical Fact Sheet (Publication No. 11-11111).
47. See id.; see also infra note 52.
48. See Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse (1996).
The NCANDS is the primary source of information on abused and neglected chil-
dren known to the state child protective services (CPS) agencies. The Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act requires that the NCCAN establish such a system
of data collection and analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 5104(1) (1996).
49. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment
1994: Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse (1996) at ix.
This number includes reports of maltreatment that may have been repeated and
counted more than once during the year. See id. at 2-1.
[Vol. 18:135144
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and three percent were the result of medical neglect. 50 Over one
million children were victims of either "substantiated" or "indi-
cated" maltreatment in 1993. 51 In 1994, forty-eight states re-
ported that 1,011,628 children were determined to have been
victims of abuse and neglect. 52 In 1990, the number was
798,318 children.53 That represents almost a twenty-seven per-
cent increase in the number of "substantiated" or "indicated"
maltreatment cases from 1990 to 1994. 54 In 1994, forty-nine
states reported that approximately 1.63 million investigations
of alleged abuse were conducted.55 More than fifty-six percent
of those investigations were found to be "not substantiated,"
and four percent were found to be "intentionally false."56 About
thirty-seven percent were found to be either "substantiated" or
"indicated."57
Because of the growing number of state hot lines and
awareness programs to inform the public on how to report sus-
pected child abuse, the number of reports has increased sub-
stantially in the last several years.58 The problem of child
abuse has appeared to be a growing problem in America, 59 and
consequently, more people are reporting suspected cases based
upon their own personal criteria of what they believe child
50. See National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Child Abuse and
Neglect Statistical Fact Sheet (Publication No. 11-11111). Nineteen percent of the
substantiated reports of maltreatment were due to other forms of maltreatment
than listed here, and some children were victims of more than one type of mal-
treatment. See id.
51. See NCCAN, In Fact... Answers to Frequently Asked Questions on Child
Abuse and Neglect (Publication No. 11-11159). "Substantiated" and "not substanti-
ated" are terms used by thirty-nine of the States that participated in the research,
while fifteen States used the term "indicated" to signify that there was reason to
suspect child abuse or neglect, but that the subsequent investigation failed to find
any proof that would meet the standards of evidence required by state law or pol-
icy. See id.; see also National Research Council, Understanding Child Abuse and
Neglect (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1993).
52. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment
1994: Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse (1996) at ix.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 2-2.
56. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment
1994: Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse (1996) at ix.
57. See id.
58. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLicKA, THE RIGHT CHOICE 252, 268 (1993). Although
the hot lines can be used for a good purpose, they can also be used to harass.
59. See Seldak, supra note 37.
11
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abuse or neglect or "maltreatment" to be.60 In particular, cases
of false child abuse reports have been on the rise for families
that do not "fit the mold" of the neighborhood or community in
which they are a part. 61 For example, families that follow a par-
ticular religious conviction are more vulnerable to the scrutiny
of neighbors, law enforcement officials and Child Protective
Services [hereinafter, "CPS"] when sending their children to a
private school or when educating their children at home. Most
social workers in CPS are obligated to investigate a report of
suspected child abuse within twenty-four or forty-eight hours,
even if the tip is anonymous with no apparent foundation.62
This causes upheaval in homes, especially when social workers
are uneducated concerning the law and constitutional rights of
families, and because of what they may personally believe the
rights of the parents to be.63 Because of the substantial number
of cases classified as unfounded, estimated to be anywhere from
fifty to sixty percent, perhaps the shocking numbers reported
by the NCCAN of abused or neglected children needs to be ques-
tioned.6 One source estimated that in 1989 alone, over one
million families were falsely accused of child abuse.65 That
number represents more than the total number of children
identified by DHHS as having been abused by the harm stan-
dard in 1986, and sixty-five percent of the total number re-
ported to have been abused in 1993.66 Another source indicated
60. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLIcKA, supra note 58.
61. See id.
62. See id. As a result, families are being subjected to intimidating confronta-
tions with child welfare agents.
63. See id. at 264. One incident in Kansas involved a caseworker from the
Social Rehabilitative Service who insisted that she had the right to come into a
home to investigate a report. After the family refused to allow the investigation,
the worker checked with her superior who admitted that she had no authority to
enter the home. Surprised, the worker admits to the family's attorney that no one
had ever refused her entry before. See id.
64. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLicKA at 267-269, supra note 58. One social worker
in Chicago commented that well over fifty percent of all referrals were discovered
to be "unfounded," and that many cases end up classified as unfounded after fami-
lies are broken apart and children put in foster homes. She added that many hos-
pitals and health care centers are in "the business of always finding child abuse,"
and that many younger social workers are encouraged to go on "fishing expedi-
tions." Id.
65. See id. at 274 (quoting MARY PRIDE, THE CHILD ABUSE INDUSTRY, 13-14
(1989)).
66. See Sedlak, supra note 37.
146 [Vol. 18:135
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that in 1987, there were 1,306,800 false child abuse reports
which represents over half of the reported cases. 67 If the
number of false reports has grown proportionately with the to-
tal number of reports of suspected child abuse, the percentage
of unfounded or false reports could actually be greater than
sixty-five percent.68 However, there is data available which
suggests that while the total number of reports is growing each
year, the percentage of false or unfounded reports is also on the
rise.69 Since the terms, "maltreatment," "abuse" or "neglect"
can now be applied to so many situations, no objective standard
seems to be controlling. A common allegation raised is the "thin
child" accusation, as well as the "lingering colds" accusation,
67. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, supra note 58 at 275 (quoting RICHARD WEx-
LER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD ABUSE
86-88 (1990)). Wexler reported that out of every 100 reports of suspected child
abuse, at least fifty-eight are false; twenty-one are poverty cases; six are sexual
abuse; four are minor physical abuse; four are unspecified physical abuse; three
are emotional maltreatment; three are "other maltreatment;" and only one is ma-
jor physical abuse. See RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VIC-
TIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 86-88 (1990). Child Protection Services in
Cobb County Georgia received 4,196 reports of child abuse in 1991. See CHRISTO-
PHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT CHOICE (1993). Only 879 (21%) were confirmed. See id.
In New Hampshire, during the same year, the Department of Child and Youth
Services documented 6,434 reports of abuse with 86.2% of the reports (5,524) turn-
ing out to be false. See id.
68. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 52 at 2-2.
NIS-3 claims a sixty-seven percent increase in children abused in the United
States from 1986-1993; see also Christopher J. Klicka, supra note 67 at 268: One
social worker after closing a fabricated case of child abuse admitted that ninety
percent of all the cases she handled turned out to be "unfounded."
69. In New Hampshire, fifty-four percent of reports were false in 1984 (2,041
out of 3,855). See id. at 273. In 1990, eighty-six percent (4,907 out of 5,616) were
false. See id. Dr. Douglas Besharov of the American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research published the following:
Much of the present high level of intervention is unwarranted and some is
demonstrably harmful to the children and families involved. More than
sixty-five percent of all reports of suspected child maltreatment-involving
over 750,000 children per year-turn out to be "unfounded".... The present
level of over-reporting is unreasonably high and is growing rapidly. There
has been a steady increase in the number and percentage of "unfounded"
reports since 1976, when approximately only thirty-five percent of reports
were "unfounded."
Id. at 274; see also Douglas Besharov, Doing Something About Child Abuse: The
Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
556 (1985).
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often heard during flu season. 70 The false allegation of "lack of
supervision" is one of the most common phrases that accompa-
nies charges of educational neglect against those that school
their children at home. 71
Many social workers have become disheartened with the
abuse of authority in their own departments, and have helped
give birth to a new term now being applied to the child welfare
system: "the child abuse industry."72 "The war against child
abuse has become a war against children. Every year, we let
hundreds of children die, force thousands more to live with
strangers, and throw a million innocent families into chaos. We
call this 'child protection."' 73 Social workers are not the only
people aware of the number of false cases of child abuse pro-
pelled by CPS all over the country. After an investigation that
included interviews with over 250 social workers, therapists,
70. See KLicKA supra note 67 at 260. An anonymous caller's report in Wiscon-
sin, evidently in disagreement with the parents' religious beliefs and practices,
was documented as follows:
The caller was concerned because the children were all thin and thought
that removal of food was possibly a form of discipline. The caller thought
this discipline may have been a practice of the parents' religion which was
thought to have been Born Again. The caller thought that these parents
give a lot of money to the church and spend little money on groceries. The
caller's last, somewhat passing concern, was that [the mother] home schools
her children.
Id.
71. See id. at 258. The following is an attorney's account of a report made in
Michigan by an anonymous caller:
A home school family was reported by an anonymous tipster who claimed
the children were not supervised, the children did not attend school, the
boys ran around barefoot, an old rusty car was in their yard, the boys slept
in the attic, and one boy liked to kill mice.... I talked with the child welfare
agent who said she would prosecute the family for neglect and get a search
warrant. She also wanted a special study done on the child who killed mice
because she thought he might have a psychological problem. We were able
to prove to the social worker that the children were being legally home
schooled, that there was no rusty car in the yard (except their own func-
tional, slightly rusty car parked in the driveway), and the children did not
sleep in the attic. As far as lack of supervision, I told the agent the charge
was false, and the children have the right to play in their own yard. In
regard to killing mice coming from a nearby swamp, we had no apologies but
wondered at the competence of the agent. As a result, the case was closed.
Id.
72. See id. at 268; see also MARY PRIDE, THE CHILD ABUSE INDUSTRY (1989).
73. See KLIcKA supra note 67 at 268.
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judges, doctors and families, the San Diego county Grand Jury
issued a fifty-six page report in 1992 indicating that the child
protection system was, "out of control, with few checks and little
balance." 74 The Grand Jury found that the system had devel-
oped a mind-set that child abuse is rampant and biased toward
proving allegations instead of finding the truth. They further
reported that, "[in too many cases, Child Protective Services
cannot distinguish real abuse from fabrication, abuse from ne-
glect, and neglect from poverty or cultural differences." 75 Of the
74. See id. at 270 (quoting Okerblom Wilkins, Child Protection System
Ripped, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, February 7, 1992, at Al, A19).
75. See id. (quoting Okerblom and Wilkens, Child Protection System Ripped,
THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al, A19). Dr. Friedlander, a
medical expert who now makes herself available to help families who have been
falsely accused of child abuse, documented the following account on her Internet
Web site:
In late March, I went to court in another state to help a working-class family
which had contacted me through this home page. A 2-year old girl had obvi-
ous nonspecific vulvovaginitis, with a mix of flora on gram stain which in-
cluded some gram-negative diplococci, mostly extracellular. The child was
just getting over chickenpox, which might have triggered the vulvovaginitis.
The pediatrician, a self-styled expert on child sexual abuse, found an "ap-
parent healed laceration" at the 2-3 o'clock position in the hymen, no further
description. Cultures and DNA probes were negative for gonorrhea. Cul-
tures of all family members, including the grandfather, a former chief flight
mechanic on a Navy ship, were negative for gonorrhea. The child denied
any sexual stuff during the medical exams. The child struggled and cried a
lot during the child abuse exams and cultures. A smear of the 'purulent'
exudate showed no white cells, only a lot of epithelial cells. Afterwards, she
talked about 'monsters' and 'doctor monsters,' and said, "the monster(s) put
a bone in my mouth and the hair choked me" (the cotton-tipped swabs, dum-
mies) and said, "the monster had a mask" (duh).
On the strength of this evidence, the Department of Human Services
told the court, 'the perpetrator has been identified" as the grandfather, the
evidence being that he owned a Halloween mask. They told him that if he
admitted his crime and got counseling, the child would be restored to the
mother. The entire family refused. I was the sole medical witness for the
defense, which I took for free.
I poked around the medical library, confirmed and improved on what I
already knew, and was able to testify that (1) 3% of girls had a little nick in
the hymen at the 2-3 o'clock position, just naturally, and around 20-30% of
three-year-old girls have such innocent nicks ('apparent healed lacerations,'
I thought), which are no more indicative of trauma than is a double-chin; (2)
relying on a gram stain in this situation was totally unacceptable as a
means of diagnosing gonorrhea, and the bugs were probably Neisseria sicca
or one of [its] kin, common commensals, which tend to be extracellular while
gonorrhea bacteria are usually mostly intracellular; (3) the CDC guidelines
specifically direct physicians NOT to rely on a gram stain in this situation;
15
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300 cases that were reviewed, 250 (83%) needed corrective ac-
tion or reevaluation, and an estimated sixty percent involved
innocent families. 76
Because of the increased national involvement of CPS into
the affairs of otherwise normal, healthy families, several orga-
nizations have formed to provide support for families who fall
victim to over-zealous agencies in search of child abuse. 77 These
organizations also lobby for legislation that would force CPS to
regard parental rights and privacy that fall within the realm of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Many are looking for legislative relief because, in
their view, the courts have been unwilling or unable to provide
relief for families which have been traumatized by CPS investi-
(4) if this were gonorrhea, there would have been white cells in the exudate,
and the abundance of epithelial cells suggested 'resolving chickenpox' to me;
(5) the negative culture and DNA probes satisfied me that this was almost
certainly not gonorrhea; (6) there are published, empirical criteria for the
physical examination of a girl suspected of having been sexually abused,
and the 'expert' had utterly failed to address or meet these; (7) often you
never find the cause of vulvovaginitis in a child. (I should have had the
statistic, which is 70%; I'm sorry I didn't.)
We won.
From now on, I am available as a medical expert in other cases in which
I'm convinced that an allegation of child abuse is false. As always, I do not
charge truly innocent defendants. Please place links to my page as you
think would be useful.
Edward Robert Freidlander M.D., False Allegations of Child Abuse, (visited Oct. 4,
1997) <http://www.worldmall.com/erf/abuse.html>.
76. See KLicKA supra note 67 at 271. The jury also found that "patently erro-
neous testimony" by physicians from the Center for Child Protection at Children's
Hospital, which examines most of the local children suspected of being abused,
"played a significant role" in several cases in which children were removed from
their homes. Id. at 272.
77. Some of these organizations are: Victims of Child Abuse Laws (VOCAL):
P.O. Box 7653 Vallejo, California 94590; National Association of State VOCAL Or-
ganizations (NASVO); 1-800-745-8778; The Coalition of Parents: 1-800-478-9410;
The Family Research Council: 700 13th Street N.W. Suite 500, Washington, D.C.
20005; National Law Center for Children and Families: 4103 Chain Bridge Road,
#410, Fairfax, VA 22030-4105, (703) 691-4626; National Coalition for Protection of
Children and Families: 800 Compton Road, Suite 9244, Cincinnati, OH 45231;
(513) 521-6227; Victims of Child Abuse Laws: 930 G Street, Sacramento, CA
95814; Families for Freedom of York, Pennsylvania, Box 338, Dover, PA 17315;
The Institute for Children: 1-617-491-4691; Children's Rights Project of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union: 132 West 43rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036; Center for
Constitutional Rights: 666 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10012.
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gatory abuse.78 However, with forty-three states reporting that
1,111 child fatalities resulted from maltreatment in 1994
alone,79 a solution must be presented that protects both the
families as well as those children who are true victims of abuse
or neglect.
In its first report in 1990, the U.S. Advisory Board on Child
Abuse and Neglect,80 "concluded that the problem of child mal-
78. See KLicKA supra note 67 at 271. "The Juvenile Court system, which
should be the ultimate check in the system, 'is not fulfilling its role.'" The jury
found that the judge does not appear 'to offer an even playing field in which the
judicial officer serves as a neutral arbiter of the facts.'" Id. (quoting Okerblom and
Wilkens, Child Protection System Ripped, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Feb. 7,
1992, at Al, A19). "Rarely, the jury said, does a judge demand a 'high standard of
performance' from the Social Services staff. The judges 'are viewed and appear to
view themselves as pro-child which translates to pro-DSS,' it said." Id. (quoting
Abrahamson, Child Protection System in S.D. Scored by Grand Jury, THE Los AN-
GELES TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al, A28-A29). Six bills were approved by the Califor-
nia Judicial Committee to try and deal with the problem of child abuse and family
reunification. Melissa Kludjian, aide to Senator Richard G. Polanco said in Jun. of
1996:
We decided major reform was needed when you have 100 to 200 children
killed per year in California .... We realize that there's a lot of accusations
that prove false and can really tear up families. But when you weigh the
two, in the senator's eyes, you'd like to do the investigation and put the
questions to rest versus not doing it and finding a child dead later.
See Jonathan Kerr, California: Legislature Tackles Flood of Child Abuse, Family
Reunification Measures, West's Legal News, Jun. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL
341225.
79. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment
1994: Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse (1996), at 2-9.
The rate of child fatalities in the reporting States was approximately 2 per 100,000
children younger than 18 years of age. See id.
80. The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect was formed under
the Child Abuse and Treatment Act, amendments of 1988, and consists of 15 mem-
bers appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 5102 (1994) which provides in part:
the Secretary shall appoint members from the general public who are indi-
viduals knowledgeable in child abuse and neglect prevention, intervention,
treatment, or research, and with due consideration to representation of eth-
nic or racial minorities and diverse geographic areas, and who represent-
(1) law (including the judiciary);
(2) psychology (including child development);
(3) social services (including child protective services);
(4) medicine (including pediatrics);
(5) State and local government;
(6) organizations providing services to disabled persons;
(7) organizations providing services to adolescents;
(8) teachers;
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
treatment in the United States had escalated to the level of a
national emergency based on the alarming increase in the
number of abuse and neglect reports and the negative conse-
quences" for children and society in general.8' In its fifth report
made in April of 1995, Deanne Tilton Durfee, Chairperson for
the Board wrote:
The cruel realization that parents and caretakers can kill their
own children has been difficult for our Nation to face. Indeed,
many who make policies, direct programs, and deliver services to
children and families have found it difficult to accept. Yet, this is
reality.
For so many who question the importance of providing pre-
ventive services to high risk families, especially those with small
children, let this report serve as a reminder of what the tragic
outcome of indifference may be. For those who believe that the
child protection system is overly intrusive, let us recall how we
might have wished there had been a meaningful intervention
before the death of a helpless young victim. Let us also ask how a
strong community support system - friends, family, neighbors -
could have helped assure the safety of a preschool child who was
never seen outside the home until autopsy.8 2
The 1995 summary went on to report that Phil McClain's re-
search at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [here-
inafter, "CDC"] suggested that 5.4 out of every 100,000 children
age four and under die as result of abuse and neglect.8 3 That
number, estimating conservatively, may be as high as 11.6 per
100,000 children due to the misclassification of child deaths.84
In its study, members of the U.S. Advisory Board met in June of
1994 with members of the Family Violence Program85 at the
(9) parent self-help organizations;
(10) parents' groups;
(11) voluntary groups;
(12) family rights groups;
(13) children's rights advocates.
42 U.S.C. 5102(c) (1994).
81. See Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't. of Health and
Human Services, A Nation's Shame: Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect in the U.S., A
Report of the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect at xxi (1995).
82. Id. at xv.
83. See id. at xxiv-xxv.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 151. The Family Violence Program began in 1987 and was the
result of a hearing held at the prison in 1985 dealing with the relationship between
[Vol. 18:135
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Bedford Hills Women's Correctional Facility in Bedford Hills,
New York to try and understand the effect of CPS and social
services on their personal experience as abused children and as
perpetrators of abuse.8 6 In her own words, this was one wo-
man's story:
My terror and rage led to the death of my 6-week-old son. I make
no excuses for my acts. What I share with you is an effort to un-
derstand myself and others, and perhaps in some way to find even
a small degree of forgiveness in myself.
What I want this Board to know is two things: first, that my
son's death was tragic; and second, that it was not until a series of
investigations of the events that any meaningful intervention
worked for the rest of my five children.
My husband first had sex with me when I was 4 years old,
and later he had sex with me and my children. My life and my
children's lives have always been hard. On the day my son died, I
had gone to a place where I was high on pills and alcohol at least
80 percent of the time. I was disgusted with everything and furi-
ous. The more I drank, the angrier I got.
In my craziness that day, I was trying to run away from my
husband with my children. The baby's zipper got stuck. I was
panicking because I thought he was coming home, and when my
son cried, I struck him. I was so out of control I didn't even realize
he was dead. He was quiet. I dressed him and put all the kids in
the car and started driving around.
I attempted to kill us all by driving over an embankment into
Sheepshead Bay. All I succeeded in doing was banging up the car,
and my husband found us. I was never arrested for the death of
my son or charged, but my husband and I were later charged with
and found guilty of sexual abuse. The irony is that they thought
my son died as a result of whiplash.
I share these things with you because there were no interven-
tions for me as a child. I was tortured physically and sexually for
as long as I can remember. I never knew what normal was or
incarcerated women and domestic violence. The goal was, "to provide women with
a safe and supportive environment to help them identify and address experiences
of violence and victimization in their lives." Women participate voluntarily and
must complete an 8-week orientation session to join. The program is currently the
only one of its kind in the country. See U.S. Dep't. of Health and Human Services,
A Nation's Shame: Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect in the United States, A Report of
the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect at 153.
86. See Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't. of Health and
Human Services, supra note 81 at 151.
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could be. I am a woman and a mother who hurts deeply inside,
but I am not a monster. I am a hurting soul. I have a wounded
soul, and perhaps the deepest pain is that I became just like all of
those people in my life that tortured me.8 7
The advisory board's report made clear how intricate the
problem of child abuse really is.88 Sociologically, economically,
legally, and emotionally challenging, the problem we are exper-
iencing as a society is not single but multi-faceted. Therefore,
this problem cannot be solved merely through expanded govern-
ment agency intervention.
Part III - The Current View in the Courts
Meyer v. Nebraska8 9
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.90
The Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
[without doubt . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.9 1
This pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska92 was one of the first opportunities the Court
used to deal with parents' fundamental right to raise their chil-
dren.93 In striking down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teach-
ing of any subject in any language other than English prior to
the eighth grade, the Court refused to give place to governmen-
87. See id. at 151-52.
88. See id. at xxvii-xxxvi.
89. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
91. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
92. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
93. See id. at 399-400.
154 [Vol. 18:135
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/6
PARENTAL RIGHTS
tal methods or means that conflict with the Constitution. 94 The
importance of such insistence becomes clear in contrast to possi-
ble alternatives. Plato, in his Ideal Commonwealth states:
[t]hat the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their chil-
dren are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child,
nor any child his parent ... The proper officers will take the off-
spring of the god parents to the pen or fold, and there they will
deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter;
but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance
to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown
place, as they should be.95
Implementing its ideas that were "wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest," Sparta, as the Court pointed
out, gathered its seven year old males into barracks and en-
trusted their education and training to official guardians. 96
The Court in this case expressly stated that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment established as fun-
damental the parents' right to "establish a home and bring up
children."97 The parent-child relationship and the obligations
and rights inherent in it were affirmed as protected by the Con-
stitution.98 The Court, in this affirmation, afforded parents
substantive due process rights in the upbringing of their
children.
The Right to Privacy
Two years after the decision in Meyer, Justice McReynolds
held in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters99 that Oregon's Compul-
sory Attendance Act was unconstitutional in requiring that
94. See id. at 401.
95. See id. at 401-02. If we had ended up recognizing the state's honorable
goal of maximizing the quality of its citizens physically, mentally or morally with-
out insisting that its means of achieving that end strictly comport with our Consti-
tution, the end result might well have been the implementation of Plato's
philosophy.
96. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 400. "The Ordinance of 1787 declares: 'Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' Corresponding to
the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children educa-
tion suitable to their station in life..." Id.
99. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1997] 155
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"every parent, guardian or other person having control or
charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years.. .
send him 'to a public school .. ' "o100 In recognizing "that the
Act of 1922 unreasonably interfere [d] with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control,"101 the Court pointed out that "[the
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. "102
With the parent-child relationship and the right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children recognized by the
Court as firmly established under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the issue of a family's right to privacy had just started to de-
velop under Meyer and Pierce, but did not progress until almost
a generation later.103 In 1944, the Court finally had an opportu-
nity to address that issue in Prince v. Massachusetts. 104 Sarah
Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of violating Massa-
chusetts' child labor laws by having her nine-year-old niece,
Betty, sell magazines on the street.10 5 Sarah insisted that Mas-
sachusetts was interfering with the "rightful exercise of her
religious convictions."10 6 The Court was able to reaffirm the
privacy rights of parents without compromising an important
state interest.
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither sup-
ply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions
have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter. 107
100. Id. at 530.
101. Id. at 534-35.
102. Id. at 535.
103. See David M. Wagner, Meyer, How You've Grown: The Strange Transfor-
mation of the Supreme Court's Privacy Doctrine, (reprinted in FAMILY RESEARCH
COUNCIL: AT THE PODIUM (Apr. 21, 1994)) <http://www.frc.org/frc/podium/
pd94flgr.html> (visited Nov. 3, 1997).
104. 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944).
105. See id. at 159-60.
106. See id. at 159.
107. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted).
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Though this clearly reaffirms parental rights toward their
children, the Court brought the issue of privacy into play by re-
ferring to "the private realm of family life." 08 However, the
Court carefully balanced its reaffirmation of parental rights by
declaring that in areas that concern child welfare, such as "the
crippling effects of child employment," the State could act to
protect children by "limiting parental freedom and
authority." 0 9
When an Amish family, based on their religious convic-
tions, chose to remove their children from public school after the
eighth grade, the Supreme Court found that the state's "high
responsibility for education of its citizens" was not more compel-
ling than a parent's liberty interest in directing the education of
their children." 0 The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder"' stated
that "[elven more markedly than in Prince ... this case involves
the fundamental interest of their children."" 2 As in Prince, the
Court mentioned again that "the power of the parent, even
when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limita-
tion ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens."1" 3
By recognizing certain relationships as protected, other
family rights have been declared fundamental, in cases like
Skinner v. Oklahoma."14 The Skinner Court, in addressing the
unconstitutionality of a law requiring sterilization as a criminal
punishment, recognized marriage and procreation as the basic
rights of man, and "fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race." 115 In Skinner, the relationship between hus-
band and wife was recognized through the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 6 rather than through
108. Id.
109. Id. at 167-68.
110. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
111. See id.
112. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
113. Id. at 233-34.
114. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
115. See id. at 541.
116. See id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977).
[The] right of procreation . . . rests more securely . . . on the interest in
status and dignity ... The Choice to be ... a parent is, among other things,
1997]
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the Due Process Clause. Though the justification the Court
used was different than in Pierce, the same relationship was be-
ing protected through an implied constitutional right.
The first case in which the Court discussed the right of "pri-
vacy" in the context of a protected relationship was Griswold v.
Connecticut.117 In affirming the principles and doctrines of
Meyer and Pierce, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute
that prohibited any person from using "any drug, medicinal ar-
ticle or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.""l8
The Court used the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amend-
ments 1 9 to describe what it called "zones of privacy,"120 older
than the Bill of Rights. 12' Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion wrote:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private no-
tions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so
rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental." 122
He felt strongly that the right to privacy was firmly founded in
the Constitution:
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the
right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these
fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no particular pro-
vision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from dis-
rupting the traditional relation of the family - a relation as old
and as fundamental as our entire civilization - surely does not
show that the Government was meant to have the power to do
so. 123
a choice of social role and of self-concept. For the state to deny such a choice
is for the organized society to deny the individual ... the presumptive right
to be treated as a person, one of equal worth among citizens.
Id. at 32.
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
118. Id. at 479-80.
119. Id. at 484. "The Ninth Amendment... was proffered to quiet expressed
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to
cover all essential rights and that specific mention of certain rights would be inter-
preted as a denial that others were protected .... " Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89.
120. See id. at 484.
121. See id. at 486.
122. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring ) (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 495-96.
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The Fourth Amendment's assurance of "[tihe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" 124 was finally at-
tached to protected relationships defined in Griswold seven
years prior to Wisconsin v. Yoder.125 Though the Court in Gris-
wold was clearly interested in protecting the marital relation-
ship, it did not forget the family or parental rights: "[tihe entire
fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly under-
line its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to mari-
tal privacy and to marry and to raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected." 26
The Effects of a New Privacy Doctrine on Parents and
Children
There is no doubt that Griswold was part of an overall sex-
ual revolution that was occurring in America and that its effects
in protecting the privacy of the marriage relationship extended
not just to the family in general, but far beyond. 127 In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 28 decided only seven years later, the Court af-
forded a new class of relationships protected under the
Constitution: that of unmarried people. 29 The Court, in a
seven-to-one decision, declared a Massachusetts statute uncon-
stitutional under the Equal Protection Clause; the statute had
prohibited the distribution of any drug or device to unmarried
persons for the prevention of conception, thereby providing dis-
similar treatment for married and unmarried people.'30 David
Wagner, Director of Legal Policy at the Family Research Coun-
cil in Washington, D.C. considered the effects of Eisenstadt on
the privacy rights of families today.131 In discussing the exten-
sion of the Equal Protection Clause to the unmarried, Wagner
claims that the decision
124. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125. See supra note 110.
126. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Golberg J., concurring).
127. See David M. Wagner, supra note 103.
128. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 438-39.
131. See Wagner, supra note 103.
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completely contradicted the rhetoric in Griswold about marriage:
whereas Griswold had cited the special, sacred nature of the mar-
ital relationship as a basis for finding a privacy right, Eisenstadt
heaped scorn on the notion that marriage is anything special, and
affirmed instead the continuing legal and metaphysical separate-
ness of spouses.132
Wagner follows the evolution of the privacy doctrine
through Roe v. Wade, 133 decided only a year after Eisenstadt,
and suggests that through Roe, the Court
marked the final repudiation of the old relational approach to pri-
vacy.., and inaugurated an era in which privacy stands for a sort
of erotic hyper-individualism: an individual's right to define him-
or herself, especially through sexual activity, free from all binding
commitments, and free from all encumbrances other than those
that the individual freely and continuously chooses.' 34
But what does this have to do with the privacy rights of the
family and the parent-child relationship?
Wagner points out that Justice McReynolds in the 1925
Pierce case coupled parents' rights with parents' duties in pre-
paring children "for additional obligations. " 135  However,
through the evolution that Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
brought, the Family Research Council suggests that "the
growth of two overlapping trends in public policy have signifi-
cantly undermined parental authority and family autonomy." 36
Laws that have given minors access to abortion and birth con-
132. See Wagner, supra note 103. We started in the 20's with Meyer, Bartels,
Pierce, and Farrington, which affirmed a right of privacy for protected relation-
ships, namely, those of the family ... we moved on to Skinner, the sterilization
case from 1942, where we saw that the privacy doctrine had survived the death of
substantive due process and was still available to protect "marriage and procrea-
tion." Then we saw Griswold, where procreation drops out of the picture, and fi-
nally, Eisenstadt, where marriage drops out of the picture. The privacy right has
by this point become a constitutional right to reject the values that it was origi-
nally designed to protect.
See Wagner, supra note 103.
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. See Wagner, supra note 103.
135. See id.
136. Cathleen A. Cleaver & Greg Erken, Parental Rights: Who Decides How
Children are Raised? (August 1996) <http://www.frc.org/frc/fampol/fp96hpa.html>.
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trol without parental approval 137 actually begin to position the
parents' fundamental right in directing the upbringing of their
children, against the newly established rights of the child to di-
rect his or her own upbringing. 138 The first trend then, is an
assumption that children should be treated as "short adults,"
i.e., as individuals that are fully capable and legally entitled to
make decisions about their upbringing, 139 while the "second
trend involves the state's increasing propensity to substitute its
judgment for that of parents in matters relating to the upbring-
ing and education of children." 40
These trends, as well as the laws for which children's rights
advocates are lobbying,' 4 ' directly challenge the "long-standing
philosophical and legal understanding that with the parental
responsibility to protect their children from harm comes the pa-
rental right to direct their children's upbringing and educa-
tion."1 42 If this proposition is true, government agencies such
as CPS will carry out their duties on behalf of the child and his
or her rights, rather than in harmony with long established fun-
damental rights of parents, protected by the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
137. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (West 1996); see also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3206 (West 1997); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. The American Library Association [hereinafter, "ALA"] is formally op-
posed to any restrictions on a child's ability to check out any item, regardless of
pornographic content or parental objections. See Cathleen Cleaver, supra note 136
(citing AMERICAN LIBRARY AssocIATION, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL 43 (4th
Ed. 1992)). The ALA has also refused to allow parents to view the check-out
records of their minor children on the basis of children's privacy rights. See id.
According to the United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child "defines the minimum standards for civil, economic,
social, cultural, and political rights of children." See Cathleen A. Cleaver, Greg
Erken, supra note 136 (quoting United States Committee for UNICEF, Q&A on
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1996)).
142. Cathleen A. Cleaver, Greg Erken, supra note 136. 'The law's concept of
the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in ma-
turity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (quoting 1 W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES 447
(1870); 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 190 (1827)). See also infra
note 325.
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Privacy Now Being Defined More Narrowly for Parents
In January 1995, the United Nations Convention's monitor-
ing committee, charged with monitoring the progress that rati-
fying nations have made in complying with the Convention's
standards, reported "that England's parental 'opt-outs' for sex
education violated 'the right of the child to express his or her
opinion,' and corporal punishment was deemed incompatible
with 'the child's right to physical integrity."' 143 In the light of
the growth in suspected child abuse reports, problems like those
David and Nancy Newkirk encountered will occur more and
more when social workers who agree with the views expressed
by the United Nations monitoring committee are in charge:
During the 1989-1990 school year, Daniel and Nancy Newkirk
from East Lansing, Michigan, discovered that their eight-year-old
son Jason was being psychologically counseled by an unlicensed,
untrained guidance counselor against their express wishes. The
case began when Jason's teacher told the Newkirks that their son
wasn't "interacting" with classmates as she thought he should.
The parents agreed to let their son "play games" (like checkers)
with the guidance counselor but flatly refused to allow any psy-
chological counseling.
Despite this apparent understanding, the counselor began
subjecting Jason to "The Talking, Feeling, and Doing Game, a
Psychotherapeutic Game for Children." While the manufacturer
of this game warns that it is intended for use "only by mental
health professionals," the counselors had no such training.
Questions posed to young Jason from the game included:
* Tell something about your mother that gets you angry.
* What do you think about a boy who sometimes wished that his
brother were dead?
" What is the worst thing you can say about your family?
After the counseling began, the Newkirks noticed changes in their
son's attitude, and he began complaining to his parents about his
sessions with the counselor. The Newkirks confronted the school,
but were told that the relationship between the boy and the coun-
selor was "confidential." They then had a psychiatrist examine
Jason, who diagnosed the boy as having suffered emotional dam-
143. Cleaver, supra note 136 at n.28 (quoting Committee on the Rights of the
Child, Eighth Session, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of
the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland (1995)).
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age from the sessions, including separation anxiety disorder and
panic attacks. 4 4
The Newkirks filed suit in July 1991 in U.S. District Court
against the school district and some of the school staff in-
volved.145 The court's ruling was surprising and without much
explanation. In March 1993, the U.S. District Court ruled
against the parents on the basis that their allegation of a viola-
tion of their privacy rights did not state a claim under the Fed-
eral Constitution. 146 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, 47 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certio-
rari, leaving the Newkirks with no further remedy. 48
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions,4 9 students
were required to attend a school-wide sexually explicit Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (hereinafter, "AIDS") awareness
assembly given by Hot, Sexy, and Safer, Inc. 50 Ronald and Su-
zanne Brown brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging
violations of due process, the free exercise clause, and their
right to an educational environment that is free from sexual
harassment. 151 They further alleged that the school district and
the employees of Hot, Sexy, and Safer, Inc. violated their pri-
vacy right to direct the upbringing of their children according to
their views, 52 which is a constitutionally protected fundamen-
144. See Cathleen A. Cleaver & Greg Erken, Parental Rights: Who Decides
How Children Are Raised? (Aug. 1996) <http://www.frc.org/frcfampol/
fp96hpa.html> (citing Newkirk v. Lansing, 1995 WL 355664 (6th Cir, 1995) (per
curiam), cert. denied, Newkirk v. Fink, 116 S.Ct. 380 (1995)).
145. See Newkirk 1995 WL 355664.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1044 (1996).
150. See id. at 529.
151. See id.
152. The complaint alleged that Suzi Landolphi, contracted through Hot,
Sexy, and Safer, Productions Inc. (wholly owned by Landolphi):
1) told the students that they were going to have a 'group sexual experience,
with audience participation;' 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language
to describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) advocated and approved
oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during
promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized
the loose pants worn by one minor as 'erection wear; ' 6) referred to being in
'deep sh--' after anal sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized condom
with her, after which she had a female minor pull it over the male minor's
entire head and blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his 'or-
1997]
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tal right,153 and "thus can only be infringed upon a showing of a
'compelling state interest."' 1 4 They lost their case before the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in Massachusetts, alleging that
the school's opt-out policy was not followed, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 15 5 The United States Court of Appeals
found that the acts alleged are not "conscience shocking," and
therefore the Browns failed to state a claim. 56 The court ex-
plained that the state had to have engaged in "extreme or intru-
sive physical conduct." 5 7 "While the defendants' failure to
provide opt-out procedures may have displayed a certain cal-
lousness towards the sensibilities of the minors, their acts do
not approach the mean-spirited brutality" seen in other cases.'58
With regard to the violation of the alleged fundamental privacy
right, the court found that the doctrines established in both
Meyer 59 and Pierce60 were established prior to jurisprudence
being developed on what we know today as the "right to pri-
gasm face' with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that he was
not having enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a minor and told him he
had a 'nice butt.'
Id. at 529.
153. The court indicated that a "right is 'clearly established' if, at the time of
the alleged violation, '[tihe contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a rea-
sonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'"
Brown, 68 F.3d at 531 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The court also acknowledged that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents," id. at 533 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)), and that parents had a liberty interest "to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of children under their control." Brown, 68 F.3d at 533 (quoting Pierce, 268
U.S. at 534-35).
154. Brown, 68 F.3d at 532.
155. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc. 116 S.Ct. 1044 (1996)
(mem.).
156. See Brown, 68 F.3d at 532. The court indicated that there are two theo-
ries under which a plaintiff can bring a substantive due process claim: 1) the dem-
onstration of an identified liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and 2) the state's conduct must "shock the conscience." Id. at 531.
157. Id. at 531. The court also refers to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), where the standard for conscience shocking claims was established. There,
the court held that the government could not use evidence that was obtained by
pumping a defendant's stomach against his will because that kind of conduct is so
egregious that it "shocked the conscience" and offended even "hardened sensibili-
ties." Brown, 68 F.3d at 531 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
158. See id. at 532; see also Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427 (1st Cir. 1995);
Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991).
159. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
160. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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vacy." Further, the court noted that "the Supreme Court has
yet to decide whether the right to direct the upbringing and ed-
ucation of one's children is among those fundamental rights
whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny."'161
Parents' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Standing
Diminished
In H.R. v. State Department of Human Resources,162 a
Houston County Department of Human Resources (hereinafter,
"DHR") received an anonymous report of child abuse and ne-
glect on November 5, 1991.163 A second report was received by
the department the very next day. 64 A social worker, Donna
Jones, was assigned to the case on December 3, 1991.165 Jones
went to the home and explained to the mother that they had
received complaints of child abuse and neglect, and that she
needed to talk to the children and to see the home. 166 The
mother refused to allow Ms. Jones to interview the children. 167
As a result, on January 15, 1992, Jones petitioned the Juvenile
Court to "assume jurisdiction.., and order access to these chil-
dren as well as any psychological or medical exams necessary to
complete this investigation."168 This request was made pursu-
ant to an Alabama statute which provides that when consent to
investigate the home or interview the child cannot be obtained,
"a court of competent jurisdiction, upon cause shown, shall or-
der the parents or persons in charge of any place where the
161. Brown, 68 F.3d at 533. The court further explained that in its mind,
though the Meyer and Pierce cases stand for the premise that the state does not
have the power to "'standardize its children' or to 'foster a homogeneous people,'"
neither do parents have a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curricu-
lum at the public school to which they choose to send their children. Id. at 533.
The court draws a distinction between the state prohibiting a parent from teaching
their child German or sending him or her to a parochial school and the parent
saying to the state, "[y]ou can't teach my child subjects that are morally offensive
to me." Id. at 534.
162. 612 So. 2d 477 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied, No. 1920126 (Ala. Feb.
5, 1993).
163. See id. at 477-78.
164. See id. at 478.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See H.R., 612 So. 2d at 478.
168. Id.
19971 165
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child may be to allow the interview, examinations and investi-
gations" by DHR. 169
At the hearing to determine whether there was "cause
shown," the referee indicated that she considered the receipt of
a report or complaint, anonymous or not, sufficient "cause
shown" under the statute. 170 Based on the reports received from
DHR, the Juvenile Court entered an Order for DHR to enter the
home and complete its investigation. 17 The mother contended
that the order for entry into her home was given without prob-
able cause and was therefore in violation of her right against
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 172 The Alabama Supreme Court responded by saying:
[tihe "cause shown" was unsworn hearsay and could, at best, pres-
ent a mere suspicion. A mere suspicion is not sufficient to rise to
reasonable or probable cause .... [T]he case worker cannot be
empowered to enter private homes, poor or rich, without reason-
able cause to believe that the charged acts are occurring. Such an
entry is in pursuit of an investigation which may or probably will
result in a criminal charge or in removal of custody of children.
We consider that the legislature did not intend to authorize an
unconstitutional act .... 1
73
Recent cases have shown that social workers believe they
are empowered to enter homes on a tip, anonymous or other-
wise, which becomes their "cause shown."1 74 As a rule, the
169. Id.
170. See id. at 479.
171. See id. at 478.
172. See H.R., 612 So. 2d at 478. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution provides: "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by an Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173. See id. at 479-80. Here the Alabama Supreme Court recognized the right
to privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. DHR's petition to show
.cause shown" had simply indicated that there had been two anonymous reports
provided over the phone regarding certain conditions or events alleged to have ex-
isted or occurred in the mother's home. See id. at 479.
174. See Cathleen A. Cleaver, Parental Rights: Whose Children Are They?
(Sept. 20, 1995) <httpJ/www.frc.org/frc/perspective/pv95jlpn.html>.
A steady drumbeat of Child Protective Services tragedies reveals an increas-
ing nonchalance about the sanctity of the family unit on the part of govern-
ment social workers who take children from their homes on little more than
rumors. This "loot first and ask questions later" approach reflects the height
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lower courts are not upholding the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier
decisions concerning the fundamental rights of parents to guide
the upbringing of their children. 175 Whether the action involves
a school guidance counselor, social worker, outside sex educa-
tion consultant, or as will be discussed later, local law enforce-
ment officials, parental standing is being increasingly
challenged. 176
In the Kansas case of Franz v. Lytle, 7 7 police Officer Lytle
was dispatched to investigate a report "of a child who was possi-
bly in need of care." 78 A neighbor, Ms. Brickley, first called the
Kansas Social and Rehabilitative Services [hereinafter, "SRS"I
which told her to call the police because there was no
caseworker available. 179 When Ms. Brickley called the police,
she told them that "her neighbor's two year old daughter,
of arrogance, and does untold damage to the very souls CPS was designed to
protect. Tragically, however, there are real cases of intra-family abuse and
neglect. But in too many such cases, protective government agencies com-
pletely fail to intervene. That our child protection system needs improve-
ment is apparent, but no case of under-enforcement can support a blanket
sanction of over-enforcement so obtrusive as to be self-defeating.
Id.
175. See, e.g., notes 149-161.
176. See id.
177. 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993).
178. Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
179. See id. at n.1. With respect to reporting of child abuse, the Kansas Code
for Care of Children provides in part:
(a) When any of the following persons has reason to suspect that a child has
been injured as a result of physical, mental or emotional abuse or ne-
glect or sexual abuse, the person shall report the matter promptly as
provided in subsection (c) or (e).
(b) Any other person who has reason to suspect that a child has been in-
jured as a result of physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or
sexual abuse may report the matter as provided in subsection (c) or (e).
(c) Except as provided by subsection (e), reports made pursuant to this sec-
tion shall be made to the state department of social and rehabilitation
services. When the department is not open for business, the reports
shall be made to the appropriate law enforcement agency. On the next
day that the state department of social and rehabilitation services is
open for business, the law enforcement agency shall report to the depart-
ment any report received and any investigation initiated pursuant to
subsection (a) of K.S.A. 38-1524 and amendments thereto. The reports
may be made orally or, on request of the department, in writing.. ..
(f) Willful and knowing failure to make a report required by this section is a
class B misdemeanor ..
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (1996).
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Ashley Franz, was unsupervised, wet, and unclean." 80 Officer
Lytle was then dispatched to investigate the report.'18 When he
arrived, Ms. Brickley told him that Ashley had a severe diaper
rash and stank from constantly being urine-soaked. 8 2 Officer
Lytle asked Ms. Brickley to remove Ashley's diaper, and then he
proceeded to take five or six photographs, 8 3 of what was charac-
terized by the officer later as a "very severe rash."18 4 This was
done without either parent being notified 8 5 Officer Lytle then
went to inform Mrs. Franz, Ashley's mother, that he had just
examined Ashley and that she would be contacted by SRS. 186
According to the report Officer Lytle later made, he was investi-
gating "a possible molesting case" and was concerned about
leaving the children at the home because this might be a poten-
tial molestation case. The officer also reported that he "was
180. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
181. See id. Section 38-1523 of the Kansas Code for Care of Children provides
in part:
Investigation for child abuse or neglect. The state department of social and
rehabilitation services and law enforcement officers shall have the duty to
receive and investigate reports of child abuse or neglect for the purpose of
determining whether the report is valid and whether action is required to
protect the child from further abuse or neglect. If the department and such
officers determine that no action is necessary to protect the child but that a
criminal prosecution should be considered, the department and such law en-
forcement officers shall make a report of the case to the appropriate law
enforcement agency.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1523(a) (1996).
182. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
183. See id. The Kansas Code for Care of Children, forbidding the
photographing of minors taken into custody except in certain instances, raises a
question of lawfulness concerning the taking of photographs of a child who is not
yet in custody for purposes of a warrantless search. The Code provides in part:
(a) Fingerprints or photographs shall not be taken of any person under 18
years of age who is taken into custody for any purpose, except:
(1) As authorized by K.S.A. 38-1611 and amendments thereto; or
(2) If authorized by a judge or district court having jurisdiction.
(b) Fingerprints or photographs taken under subsection (a)(2) shall be kept
regularly distinguishable from those of persons of the age of majority.
(c) Fingerprints and photographs taken under subsection (a)(2) may be sent
to a state or federal repository only if authorized by a judge of the district
court having jurisdiction.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1518 (1996).
184. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
185. See id.
186. See id.
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/6
PARENTAL RIGHTS
shown the bruising of the vaginal area by the female caller."'8 7
He was then advised by his captain that he should return with
a female officer and take the child for a medical examination to
determine the cause of the bruising and "alleviate the problem
of protective custody."188
After telephoning a former neighbor and cousin of the
Franz's who also stated that Ashley was unsupervised and al-
ways urine-soaked,'8 9 both Officer Lytle and Officer Jeanette
Schlabach returned to the Franz residence in full uniform and
carrying side arms. 90 Being the only one home, Mrs. Franz
complied with their request to examine Ashley by removing her
pants, laying her down on the floor and spreading her legs apart
as ordered.19' Officer Lytle touched Ashley's vaginal area to
check for soreness and swelling and he believed he saw some
discoloration in the area. 192
After Mrs. Franz explained that she had been trying to
"potty train" Ashley, Officer Lytle gave her the choice of either
voluntarily taking her up to have her examined in the dner-
gency room or having Ashley taken into protective custody. 193
Mrs. Franz called her husband, at which point Officer Lytle ex-
plained to him that Ashley did have "some type of discoloration,
bruises, whatever it is on her legs and around her vaginal area
and we need to have it checked."1 94 Mr. Franz came home, and
they were all escorted to the hospital where Ashley was ex-
amined. The hospital report indicated that the reason for ad-
mission was possible sexual assault.195 The attending physician
concluded that Ashley had "mild redness to labial folds, no
tears, bruising, or edema."196 The officers apologized.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
190. See id. at 785.
191. See id. The application of the Fourth Amendment restrictions to war-
rantless searches without probable cause remains constant with the exception of
exigent circumstances, consent and "any of the recognized exceptions to the war-
rant requirement." Id. at 786.
192. See id. at 785.
193. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
194. Id. at 786.
195. See id. at n.5.
196. Id. at 786.
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The parents brought a section 1983 action 197 alleging
Fourth and Fourteenth amendment violations of invasion of pri-
vacy, trespass, and deprivation of liberty.198 Officer Lytle ap-
pealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment for
qualified immunity from the parents' claims. 99 He made his
appeal on the basis that the court failed to draw a distinction
between the conduct of a police officer investigating a report of
possible child abuse and neglect and that of a social worker
that needs neither probable cause nor a search warrant.200 In
fact, Officer Lytle asked that the court declare that police of-
ficers should be granted the same latitude as social workers in-
vestigating reports of child abuse. 20' He contended that the
society's need to protect its children outweighs the plaintiffs in-
terests in privacy. 20 2 At issue was, "whether, at the time de-
fendants acted, it was clearly established law that a child abuse
investigation conducted by police officers is subject to the prob-
able cause or warrant requirements." 20 3 The district court drew
a comparison between law enforcement officers being trained in
the requirements of probable cause and warrants and social
workers who "have no such fluency of the legal standards."20 4 In
responding, the court of appeals affirmed and relied heavily on
the analysis used by the district court in reaching its
conclusion.20 5
Lytle made a motion for summary judgment claiming that
he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied this
motion. Officer Lytle appealed the Franzs' claim of Fourth
Amendment violations based on invasion of privacy, trespass
and deprivation of liberty. 20 6 Officer Schlabach was granted
qualified immunity from allegations of violating the Franzs'
Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial integrity without due
process and interference with property. The Franzs voluntarily
197. See id. at 784.
198. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 786.
199. See id. at 784.
200. See id. at 784-85.
201. See id. at 786.
202. See id. at 785.
203. Franz, 997 F.2d at 786; see also Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 830.
204. Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 831; see also Franz, 997 F.2d at 786.
205. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 784.
206. See id. at 786.
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chose to dismiss those allegations on appeal. 20 7 With respect to
Officer Lytle, however, the court of appeals agreed with the dis-
trict court that he had been conducting a criminal investigation
through searches "aimed at uncovering incriminating evidence
of sexual abuse by one or both of the parents."208 The court
noted that this was exactly the type of conduct that was pro-
scribed by the Fourth Amendment without consent or exigent
circumstances, and that no reasonable officer would have be-
lieved the searches he conducted to have been lawful based
solely on the information provided. 20 9 Even if the facts did indi-
cate probable cause, no exigency existed to prevent Officer Lytle
from obtaining a warrant, nor could he have reasonably be-
lieved that the Franzs had given consent to the searches.
210
The court of appeals relied upon Anderson v. Creighton21' in
addressing Officer Lytle's argument that he should have been
given the same latitude as that of a social worker in investigat-
ing reports of child abuse and thus protected by qualified immu-
nity.212 Anderson is similar to the present case in that it also
involved a warrantless search without probable cause or exi-
gent circumstances. 21 3 The court stated that the test for the ap-
plication of qualified immunity is whether the court can
conclude that a reasonable officer in the same position at the
time of the alleged violation, "schooled in the governing princi-
ples of the Fourth Amendment, [would believe] he was acting in
207. See id. at n.6.
208. Franz, 997 F.2d at 786 (quoting Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 831).
209. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 786.
210. See id. at n.7.
211. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
212. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 787 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40). An-
derson centered around a suit brought against an FBI agent resulting from a war-
rantless search of a home. Justice Scalia explained in that case that the common
law remedy of qualified immunity solves the competing policies of permitting dam-
ages suits against government officials for constitutional violations and yet still
providing a shield from fear of personal monetary liability to avoid inhibiting offi-
cials from doing their jobs. See Anderson, 483 U.S. 635. The test courts use, then,
for determining when to award damages in denying official qualified immunity, is
whether the right of the officials is alleged to have violated is already recognized as
"clearly established," and then, "[tihe contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
213. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 787.
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accord with those principles. If so, his conduct was lawful, and
he is entitled to qualified immunity. "214
However, the test only addresses one half of the argument,
and the court in Franz went on to consider how a social worker
fits into the scheme. 215 The court started with "the cardinal
principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 21 6 The
court opined that a full-scale search is "reasonable" if there is a
showing of probable cause accompanied by a belief that the in-
formation possessed reveals that a crime has been committed,
and that the evidence of that crime will be found in the place to
be searched.21 7 The absence of probable cause can only be justi-
fied by those "well-delineated exceptions of consent," 218 exigent
circumstances or administrative searches.21 9 Despite the facts
of this case, which clearly show that Officer Lytle proceeded as a
law enforcement officer conducting a criminal investigation, he
argued that the warrantless search that he conducted fell
within the administrative search exception. 220
Though the court fully addressed its rejection of the defend-
ant's claim that his conduct should be considered against the
same standard as that of a social worker's under similar cir-
cumstances, it still felt compelled to deal with the secondary is-
sue that this claim created - whether social workers are
relieved of the probable cause and warrant requirement when
investigating cases of child abuse or neglect, thereby relieving
Officer Lytle of any warrant requirement. 221 Officer Lytle relied
on a balancing test that the United States Supreme Court de-
veloped in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n:222
Our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
214. Id. at 787; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
215. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 788-89.
216. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
217. See id. at 788; see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
218. Franz, 997 F.2d at 788 (citations omitted).
219. See id. at 788 (citations omitted).
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989).
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law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's pri-
vacy expectations against the Government's interest to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of in-
dividualized suspicion in the particular context. 223
Armed with the authority of the Supreme Court, Officer
Lytle argued that society's interest in protecting children from
abuse supplants the need for the probable cause requirement,
as shown by the law requiring police officers to report child
abuse. 224 However, the court of appeals supported the district
court's finding that the "defendant's focus was not so much on
the child as it was on the potential criminal culpability of her
parents. That focus is the hallmark of a criminal investigation.
In contrast, a social worker's principal focus is the welfare of the
child."225 This is the distinction that justified a policy providing
for a less stringent requirement of probable cause in those
searches classified as administrative, or those performed by So-
cial Services. 226 The court also pointed out that a warrant or
probable cause requirement imposed on a social worker would
hinder his ability to investigate. 227
The Court Has Yet to Rule on Parents' Fundamental and
Substantive Due Process Rights
In addition to being relieved of the warrant and probable
cause requirements, social workers are frequently afforded
qualified immunity.228 The effects of this immunity on parental
rights are enormous. Chayo v. Kaladjian is an example of such
effects and of how law enforcement officials virtually receive the
same privilege when assisting, rather than initiating, an inves-
tigation.229 In November of 1990, Mrs. Chayo had her daughter,
223. Franz, 997 F.2d at 788 (citations omitted).
224. See id.
225. See id. at 791.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 789.
228. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability when their
conduct does not violate "clearly established" constitutional or statutory rights,
and when a reasonable person would not have known those rights to be "clearly
established." It also encourages officials to continue to promote public interest in
vigorously exercising official authority to that end. See Chayo v. Kaladjian, 844 F.
Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
229. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 166.
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Rachel Lea, x-rayed as a result of an injury to her head.230 The
x-rays showed a minor skull fracture. 231 Two months later,
Mrs. Chayo brought her other daughter, Chaya Mushka, to the
same Medical Center for more x-rays, this time for a bruise on
Mushka's forehead that her mother claimed was the result of a
fall from her high chair.232 A 2221 report 233 was filed with the
New York Department of Social Services Central Register of
Child Abuse and Maltreatment by the Medical Center that af-
ternoon.234 The New York City Human Resources Administra-
tion, Child Welfare Administration (hereinafter, "HRAICWA")
received the referral from the Central Register. 235 Supervisor
Rickson conferred with the Child Protective Manager and "de-
cided that the Chayo children had to be examined at a hospital
that evening. They also concluded that it was too late ... to get
a court order."236 They believed that the allegations in the 2221
Report were serious enough 237 as to waive the requirement for
parental consent or a court order.238 When two caseworkers ar-
rived, Mrs. Chayo let them in and cooperated when asked about
her daughters' injuries. The officers requested a physical exam-
ination of the children. Mrs. Chayo allowed the caseworkers to
look for bruises and other potential signs of abuse. 239 No addi-
tional signs were found, but the caseworkers still insisted on
bringing the children to a hospital for medical examination.240
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. A 2221 report is a report of suspected child abuse and maltreatment. See
id.
234. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 166. New York has established a statewide
central register to receive reports of child abuse and maltreatment. A single state-
wide telephone number exists for the general public that operates twenty-four
hours per day, seven days a week. In addition, a special unlisted express tele-
phone number is provided to those who are mandated by law to report alleged
child abuse or maltreatment. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 422(2) (McKinney 1992);
see also supra note 4.
235. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 166.
236. Id.
237. See id. The Report indicated that both Chaya and Rachel Lea had been
brought in for skull x-rays, and that Chaya's injuries were inconsistent with the
mother's explanation. No information was provided in the report relevant to treat-
ment or results of the medical examination. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 166-67.
240. See id. at 167.
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Unwilling to wait for Mr. Chayo, the caseworkers allowed her to
call a family friend, Rabbi Lieberman, to accompany her. When
Rabbi Lieberman arrived, he opposed the removal of the chil-
dren from the home.241 The supervisor requested police assist-
ance.242 Shortly thereafter, two police officers arrived, along
with the family attorney, and Mr. Chayo.243 The attorney in-
sisted that the children could not be examined without a court
order or parental consent.2 " After seeing the 2221 Report and
speaking with the captain, "the police agreed to aid in the re-
moval of the Chayo children."245 The caseworkers refused to in-
form the Chayos as to which hospital the children would be
taken until later that evening.246 At approximately 4:00 a.m.,
the supervisor, Ms. Rickson, was informed that the examina-
tions revealed no evidence of child abuse and thus instructed
the caseworkers to return the children to their home.247
The district court found that the social workers were pro-
tected by qualified immunity.248 Recognizing the broad discre-
tion given to social workers, the court emphasized the on-going
struggle: "[Ihf [social workers] err in interrupting parental cus-
tody, they may be accused of infringing the parents' constitu-
tional rights. If they err in not removing the child, they risk
injury to the child."249 According to the court, the test for deter-
mining if the caseworkers acted reasonably is "if the official[s]
have been presented with evidence of serious ongoing abuse and
therefore have reason to fear imminent recurrence." 25 0 The
caseworkers' actions were based on the 2221 Report, 251 which
the court determined was a reasonable basis for their decision.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 167.
245. Id. at 167.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 167.
248. See id. at 168; see also supra note 228.
249. Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 169 (citation omitted).
250. Id. (quoting Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1987)).
251. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 168. The Report specifically stated:
Mushka has bruising on the top of her forehead and on her back. Ch[ild]
was brought to [doctor] today for a skull x-ray. Mo[ther] claims ch[ild] had
fallen from a high chair. Injuries are inconsistent with explanation. Re-
cently, Rachel was brought to [doctor] for skull x-ray (Nov. '90). Mo[therl
explained that ch[ild] fell from a bunk bed. Ch[ild] had a fractured skull.
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The court found that although the caseworkers had stated to
the mother that they did not believe the children were in dan-
ger, that statement was of limited importance. 252 "To remove
children, caseworkers need not 'believe' that child abuse is
ongoing and that danger is imminent; caseworkers need only
have been 'presented with evidence' of abuse and have 'reason
to fear' that danger is imminent."253 The plaintiffs contended
that "imminent danger" was not adequately defined in the regu-
lations, "that the risk assessment factors254 [were] not priori-
tized, and that the appropriate hours for investigating child
abuse [were] not specified."255 The court indicated that because
the plaintiffs had not identified any case law that suggested
So[urce] feels ch[ildren] are being abused by parents at home and is very
concerned for ch[ildren's] safety.
Id.
252. See id. at 169.
253. Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 169 (quoting Robison, 821 F.2d at 922). The New
York Family Court Act states, however:
Where there is probable cause to believe that an abused or neglected child
may be found on premises, an order under this section may authorize a per-
son conducting the child protective investigation, accompanied by a police
officer, to enter the premises to determine whether such a child is present.
The standard of proof and procedure for such an authorization shall be the
same as for a search warrant under the criminal procedure law.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1034 (McKinney 1983).
A peace officer, acting pursuant to his special duties, police officer, or a law
enforcement official, or an agent of a duly incorporated society for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or a designated employee of a city or county
department of social services may take or keep a child into protective cus-
tody . .. without an order ... and without the consent of the parent . . .
regardless of whether the parent . . . is absent, if (i) the child is in such
circumstance or condition that his continuing in said place of residence or in
the care and custody of the parent or [legal guardian] presents an imminent
danger to the child's life or health; and (ii) there is not time enough to apply
for an order under section one thousand twenty-two.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024 (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 417
(McKinney 1994).
254. The Regulations of the Department of Social Services state:
Risk assessment means an evaluation of elements that pertain to and influ-
ence a subject of the report, other persons named in the report and any
other children in the household in order to assess the likelihood that such
child[ren] named in the report or in the household will be abused or mal-
treated in the future.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(w) (1997) (emphasis omitted).
255. Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171.
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that these defects rose to the level of constitutional violations,
they would not be regarded as such.256
The court agreed that the plaintiffs have a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in not being separated as a family,
and in being free from a medical examination without con-
sent. 257 However, the court found that an exception exists;
there is no violation of due process, when duties are performed
in an emergency as was the case in Chayo.25 8 The deprivation of
a constitutional right must have occurred without due process
of law. Therefore, the police officers were not liable because, the
court said, "the Caseworkers had sufficient reason to believe
that the Chayo children might be in imminent danger as a re-
sult of ongoing child abuse .... Consequently, the plaintiffs
were not deprived of due process by this temporary removal."259
Various jurisdictions have reaffirmed the well-settled rule
that parents have a protected liberty interest in the care and
custody of their children, while simultaneously reinforcing limi-
tations on those parental rights in order to serve the state's in-
terest in protecting children.260 Courts are finding that
256. See id.
257. See id. (citing van Emrik v. Chemung County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 911
F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1990); Duchesne v. Sugerman 566 F.2d 817, 824-25 (2d Cir.
1977)).
258. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171. "The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard and it is an 'opportunity which must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner .... "' Id. (quoting
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). The Court indicated that "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner" does not always require "the State to provide a hear-
ing prior to the deprivation of property." Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171 (quoting Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)).
259. Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171. Even though law enforcement officials are
normally held to a higher standard, their actions were justified as long as the
caseworkers' actions were deemed reasonable. See id.
260. See Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171; see also Defore v. Premore, 863 F. Supp.
91, 94 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the right to family integrity was not "clearly
established" for purposes of qualified immunity to a Section 1983 action); van Em-
rik, 911 F.2d at 866 (finding reasonable the removal of a child from the home dur-
ing a child abuse investigation when child suffered broken leg that was
characterized by attending physician as "very suspicious" of child abuse, and after
caseworkers consulted with superiors and obtained court order to remove the
child); Robison, 821 F.2d at 922 (finding reasonable the removal of children from
parents' home "if the officials have been presented with evidence of serious ongoing
abuse and therefore have reason to fear imminent recurrence"); Brown, 68 F.3d at
533; see also supra note 143; Frazier v. Bailey; 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir. 1992)
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"although the Constitution guarantees a generalized right of
family integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment, the con-
tours of [the] substantive due process rights [of parents] are not
well-defined." 261 As parental rights are increasingly being chal-
lenged, courts are being asked to define these rights more
clearly.262 Two recent decisions have evolved out of the supreme
courts of North Dakota and Iowa respectively: Raboin v. North
Dakota Department of Human Services263 and Hildreth v. Iowa
Department of Human Services.264 In Raboin, "Social Services
received a report from a person expressing concern that the
Raboins were striking their children with objects as a form of
discipline."265 The Raboins had six children who were all under
the age of eleven in October of 1994, when the report was
made. 266 An assessment worker investigated the alleged abuse,
filed a written report, and concluded that "there was probable
cause to believe child abuse had in fact occurred." 267 She indi-
cated that Brandon, age ten, relayed to her that "he was swat-
ted on the butt twenty times 'five years ago' because he swore a
lot and as a result he 'received a black and blue mark for a
couple minutes' . . .. The second oldest child, Andrew, age 9,
told Brown he received seventeen whacks on the butt for kick-
ing his little sister."268 There was no other indication in the re-
port that any of the children had "ever suffered serious physical
harm or emotional trauma from the spankings."269 The
(ruling a social worker accused of ignoring exculpatory evidence and programming
children to falsely accuse a parent of sexual abuse could not be said to have vio-
lated clearly established constitutional law, and reversing trial court in not grant-
ing qualified immunity to social worker); Doe v. Hennepin County Community
Serv. Dep't, 858 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1988) (providing qualified immunity
to officials, and declaring Minnesota statute did not give parents a constitutional
protected liberty or property interest in social services prior to child being
removed).
261. Defore, 863 F. Supp. at 95 (citing Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417
(5th Cir. 1993)).
262. See Defore, 863 F. Supp. at 95.
263. 552 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1996).
264. 550 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 1996).
265. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 331.
266. See id. at 330-31.
267. Id. at 331.
268. Id. at 334.
269. Id.
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Supreme Court of Iowa noted that it was undisputed that the
Raboin children were "healthy, happy, and well-adjusted."270
Although the state's attorney concluded there was no basis
to bring charges, the Raboins, claiming their religious freedom
had been infringed upon, were forced to file a written request
for review by the department in order to reverse the finding of
probable cause. 271 At the formal administrative hearing, the
Raboins testified that they used corporal punishment only as a
last resort and never out of anger.272 Furthermore, they stated
that "they gave their children 'a lot of love' to make sure they
knew that they were 'accepted,' while providing 'structure' and
'affection' with lots of 'verbal praise."' 273 The hearing officer
filed a written recommendation, following the hearing, that the
finding of probable cause should be reversed with a notation
made in the department's child abuse information index.274 The
director of the department rejected that recommendation and
upheld the finding of probable cause. 275 The appeal then went
to the district court, which upheld the department's finding.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in reviewing the de-
partment's decision to determine whether the agency's findings
of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 276
examined the definition of the terms "abused child" and "harm"
as defined under North Dakota law:277
270. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 330.
271. See id. at 331, 335. The Raboins asserted that their methods of disci-
pline were based on their religious beliefs and that the department was violating
their constitutional right to practice those beliefs and that the finding of probable
cause violated N.D. CENT. CODE § 500-25.1-05.1(2) (1989), which provided in part:
"[p]robable cause to believe that child abuse or neglect is indicated may not be
determined where the suspected child abuse or neglect arises solely out of conduct
involving the legitimate practice of religious beliefs by a parent or guardian." Id.
at 335. This section was amended effective January 1, 1996, to read: "[a] decision
that services are required may not be made where the suspected child abuse or
neglect arises solely out of conduct involving the legitimate practice of religious
beliefs by a parent or guardian." N.D. CENT. CODE § 500-25.1-05.1(2) (1989 &
Supp. 1997).
272. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 334.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 331.
276. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 333.
277. See id. at 333-34.
19971 179
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"Abused child" means an individual under the age of eighteen
years who is suffering from serious physical harm or traumatic
abuse caused by other than accidental means by a person respon-
sible for the child's health and welfare, or who is suffering from or
was subjected to any act involving that individual in violation of
sections 12.1-20-01 through 12.1-20-08.278
"Harm" means negative changes in a child's health which occur
when a person responsible for the child's health and welfare: ...
[i]nflicts, or allows to be inflicted, upon the child, physical or
mental injury, including injuries sustained as a result of excessive
corporal punishment[.1279
The court then found after reviewing the entire record that
there was "no evidence from which a reasonable person could
conclude the Raboins [had] committed child abuse as defined by
these statutes. There is simply no evidence the Raboin children
have suffered serious physical harm or traumatic abuse from
the spankings administered by their parents in disciplining
them."28 0 The court further stated that a reasonable person
would not conclude that a slight bruise on the buttocks could
cause a "serious 'negative change in a child's health.'"281
Although the Raboins brought parental rights into issue under
the umbrella of free exercise of religion,28 2 the court indicated
that it did not need to address or resolve this issue because it
had already determined that the Raboins' conduct did not sup-
port a finding of probable cause to indicate child abuse under
North Dakota law.283
However, the court in Hildreth, dealt with the issue of cor-
poral punishment as it relates to parental rights.28 4 As in
278. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(2) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01(1)
(1989) provides:
a. When the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below the
age of fifteen, it is no defense that the actor did not know the child's age,
or reasonably believed the child to be older than fourteen;
b. When criminality depends on the victim being a minor, it is an affirma-
tive defense that the actor reasonably believed the victim to be an adult.
N.D.CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01(1) (1989).
279. N.D.CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(4) (1989).
280. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 334.
281. Id. at 335 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(4)).
282. Id. at 335 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2)).
283. See Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 335.
284. See Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 159 (citations omitted).
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Raboin, Tracey Hildreth also claimed that the Iowa Depart-
ment of Human Services infringed upon his right to exercise his
religious beliefs and therefore violated his First Amendment
rights under the United States Constitution.285 His daughter,
Amanda, was eight years old at the time the complaint was
made.28 6 As a non-custodial parent, Tracey Hildreth was sched-
uled to pick Amanda up for visitation on February 8, 1993. He
had asked her to bathe and wash her hair to prepare for pic-
tures that were to be taken at a church function that evening,28 7
but when he arrived at Amanda's residence, he found that she
had neither bathed nor washed her hair, and told her that she
would be disciplined for disobeying.28 8 When they arrived at the
residence, Tracey Hildreth struck Amanda three times on the
buttocks with a wooden spoon over her denim jeans, but accord-
ing to the record, had discussed the reasons for the punishment
with her prior to administering it.289 Two oval red marks were
discovered by the mother a few hours later and by the school
nurse the following morning.290
The Iowa Department of Human Services found that Tra-
cey Hildreth was guilty of child abuse as a result of the spank-
ing.291 The Iowa statutory definition of child abuse is "[a]ny
nonaccidental physical injury, or injury which is at variance
with the history given of it, suffered by a child as a result of the
acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of the
child."292 The agency defined "nonaccidental injury" as "[a]n in-
jury which was a natural and probable result of a caretaker's
actions which the caretaker could have reasonably foreseen, or
which a reasonable person could have foreseen in similar cir-
cumstances, or which resulted from an act administered for the
285. See id. at 158. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
286. See Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 158.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 158-59.
290. See id. at 159.
291. See Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 158.
292. IowA CODE § 232.68(2)(a) (1996).
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specific purpose of causing an injury."2 9 3 Physical injury was
also expressed by the agency as "a necessary healing process of
bodily tissue so as to be restored to a sound and healthy condi-
tion. Implicit in the definition of 'physical injury' is a require-
ment that an external force has initially placed the bodily tissue
in an unsound or unhealthy condition."294
The administrative law judge found that the father should
have known that the "force of the blow .might cause the condi-
tion that resulted," even though he did not intend to inflict an
injury on his daughter. 295 Because the red marks clearly re-
quired a healing process, having lasted five days, the judge de-
termined that "such marks imposed in the course of discipline
are abusive."296
Tracey Hildreth brought his appeal to the district court
which reasoned that the statute only required parents to take
care not to physically injure the child when administering cor-
poral punishment, and that it was within the power of the state
to define child abuse as any nonaccidental physical injury re-
sulting from corporal punishment.297 The Supreme Court of
Iowa reversed the district court and the agency. 298 The court
pointed out that it has frequently recognized that parents do
have a right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment in rear-
ing their children. 299 The court determined that the agency
should have concluded that Tracey Hildreth "could not reason-
ably have foreseen that the rather limited striking of Amanda's
buttocks would produce a physical injury .... The laws of phys-
ics are such that when even a moderate degree of force is ad-
ministered through an instrument that makes contact with only
a small area of the body, the pressure visited upon that point
may be more than will reasonably be anticipated."300
293. Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 160 (quoting IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-175.1
(1995)).
294. Id.
295. Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 159.
296. Id. at 159. Though the mother had testified that the marks could still be
discerned after six days, the agency investigator found that after five days she
could only observe one faint red mark. See id.
297. See id. at 160.
298. See id.
299. See Hildreth, 550 N.W.2d at 159 (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 160. Justice Harris wrote for the dissent, "[pleople are commonly
presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and it strikes me as
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Part IV - Analysis
In the absence of a willingness by courts to deal with paren-
tal rights head on, the likelihood of parental rights and family
integrity prevailing is hit or miss. The risk of not granting
qualified immunity for CPS workers all over the country is one
that the courts are not willing to take. How far can we allow
social workers, who admittedly "have no such fluency of the
legal standards,"301 to break-up innocent families without even
the Fourth Amendment constraining them? Are today's courts
sending the message that the problem of child abuse is so grave
and urgent that the injuries sustained by innocent families are
minimal compared to those sustained by a child who is truly
being abused?30 2 "That our child protection system needs im-
provement is apparent, but no case of under-enforcement can
support a blanket sanction of over-enforcement so obtrusive as
to be self-defeating."30 3 While the courts tend to grant qualified
immunity to social workers who invade family privacy,30 4 Con-
gress has made it clear that we need a strong national policy
that "should strengthen families to remedy the causes of child
abuse and neglect, provide support for intensive services to pre-
vent the unnecessary removal of children from families, and
promote the reunification of families if removal has taken
place."30 5 However, because there is no consistent declaration
by courts or by Congress of parental rights when false charges
of child abuse are brought by CPS, there is no mandate to edu-
cate social workers in order to remedy the lack of "fluency of the
legal standards,"30 6 as represented by the Fourth Amendment
or by "clearly established"30 7 fundamental rights.
preposterous to pretend Hildreth did not expect a physical injury to result from
striking the child so hard'with a wooden spoon as to leave her marked for days."
Id. Justice Harris would have found that Tracey Hildreth easily qualifies as an
abuser under the Iowa administrative rule. See id. at 161; see also supra note 292.
301. Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 831; see also Franz, 997 F.2d at 786.
302. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
303. Cathleen A. Cleaver, supra note 174.
304. See supra note 228; see also Fowler, 1995 WL 67994, at *19; Newkirk,
1995 WL 355664; Brown, 68 F.3d 525, supra notes 149-151; see Cleaver, supra note
174 and accompanying text; Franz, 997 F.2d at 788, Chayo, 844 F. Supp. 163; De-
fore, 863 F. Supp. 91.
305. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
306. Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 831.
307. Brown, 68 F.3d at 531; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
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The Administrative Search: A Subterfuge
The Fourth Amendment restrictions on warrantless
searches without probable cause allow for the following excep-
tions: exigent circumstances, consent, or administrative
searches. 3°8 The administrative focus which permits less prob-
able cause actually paves the way to qualified immunity in the
courts. The question that arises from Fourth Amendment
claims that are the direct result of CPS investigatory abuse is
whether the administrative exception results in more or less
damage to the integrity of families and their Fourth Amend-
ment rights than its counterpart.3 9 "[W]e cannot say that the
Constitution requires that a visual inspection of the body of a
child who may have been the victim of child abuse can only be
undertaken when the standards of probable cause or a warrant
are met."310 The administrative search then, exempt from the
probable cause or warrant requirements, acts as a subterfuge,
providing legal probable cause for a criminal investigation
which would otherwise be non-existent. The evidence obtained
in the reasonable administrative search now serves as probable
cause for the ensuing criminal investigation in obtaining war-
308. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 788.
309. The hypothesis that justifies allowing administrative searches to proceed
absent exigent circumstances or probable cause must simply be that it is more
acceptable to violate the Fourth Amendment if a search is performed by a social
worker than by a law enforcement official. A social worker's primary concern is
supposed to be the child, not the crime, if there is one. Though a criminal investi-
gation may ensue as a result of an administrative search, founded or unfounded, at
least the original focus would have been different. If founded, we as a society want
a criminal investigation to follow and for all parties to have qualified immunity in
carrying out their duties in order to provide optimum and speedy relief to all chil-
dren involved. Even if the search appeared invasive, the difference in focus and
purpose will eliminate, in the courts' eyes, any Fourth Amendment concern.
310. Franz, 997 F.2d at 790 (quoting Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903
(7th Cir. 1986)). The United States Court of Appeals in Darryl was deciding
whether the district court correctly refused to grant a preliminary injunction. The
injunction prohibited a procedure in the Illinois Department of Children and Fam-
ily Services (DCFS) permitting caseworkers to conduct a physical exam of a child's
body for evidence of abuse. The constitutional claims made by the plaintiffs were
the privacy rights of the child and of the family in child rearing, "and the obligation
and right of responsible government to deal effectively with the stark reality of
child abuse in our society, a problem the seriousness of which has only been appre-
ciated fully in recent times and in which the methods of identification and preven-
tion must still be termed developmental." Coler, 801 F.2d at 895; see also Franz,
997 F.2d at 789 n.10.
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rants and further evidence. 311 What happens when the criminal
investigation, charging the parents with child abuse or neglect
ends up vindicating the parents? What remedy? Realistically,
there is no remedy because there was no invasion, because the
"Fourth Amendment intrusion serve[d] special governmental
needs."312 Because a social worker can request the assistance of
a law enforcement officer without probable cause and without a
warrant,31 3 the law has effectively given that social worker the
freedom and umbrella to operate with either a criminal or ad-
ministrative focus.
The standard upheld in Franz was that Officer Lytle should
not receive the same exemptive privilege for his search that a
social worker would have received performing the very same
search under the same circumstances. 314 The Franz court
pointed out that the officer's focus was different from that of a
social worker's, and that he was in uniform, carried a gun at all
times, and informed his superior officer he was investigating a
possible child molestation.31 5 However, if the neighbor, Ms.
Brickley, was successful in having SRS come to her residence
rather than the police, what result? As clearly permitted by
statute,31 6 the caseworker could have easily asked for an officer
to accompany her. Not only would the caseworker have been
311. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
312. Franz, 997 F.2d at 788 (citations omitted).
313. See supra note 259; see also Article 15 of the Kansas Code for Care of
Children which provides in part:
The state department of social and rehabilitation services and law enforce-
ment officers shall have the duty to receive and investigate reports of child
abuse or neglect for the purpose of determining whether the report is valid
and whether action is required to protect the child from further abuse or
neglect. If the department and such officers determine that no action is nec-
essary to protect the child but that a criminal prosecution should be consid-
ered, the department and such law enforcement officers shall make a report
of the case to the appropriate law enforcement agency ... When a report of
child abuse or neglect indicates (1) that the result is serious physical injury
to or serious deterioration or sexual abuse of the child and (2) that action
may be required to protect the child, the investigation shall be conducted as
a joint effort between the department of social and rehabilitation services
and the appropriate law enforcement agency or agencies, with a free ex-
change of information between them.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1523(a), (b) (1993).
314. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791; see also supra note 204.
315. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
316. See supra note 313.
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given qualified immunity, but Officer Lytle would have been
merely assisting that caseworker in her investigation. By stat-
ute, the caseworker would have had the right and authority to
investigate reports of child abuse or neglect.3 17 In fact, Officer
Lytle, after first visiting the neighbor with Ashley, could have
requested that SRS be present to legally perform the exact
same investigation conducted by him without any Fourth
Amendment repercussions. 318 Moreover, the statements by par-
ents made to social workers in many states are available to a
prosecutor to be used against the parent in prosecuting criminal
child abuse. 319 The presence of a law enforcement official at the
time those statements are made can only help in the initiation
of a subsequent criminal prosecution. 320
The Court's Refusal to Act Has Led to Proposals by State and
Federal Legislators
An obvious question remaining is whether the latitude pro-
vided by the courts to social workers conducting administrative
searches has yielded the results that would vindicate the under-
lying social policy 321 that justifies it. An even more critical is-
sue, however, and also the focus of this analysis, is the lack of
an available remedy under this social policy permitting a prob-
able cause exemption. Society is obviously ready to accept
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations as non-actiona-
ble in those instances where a child's welfare is genuinely at
stake, and but for governmental intervention, that child is at
risk of further injury or even death. But the courts have gone
much further by accepting as non-actionable those instances
317. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1523(a) (1993).
318. See id.
319. See Scott W. Somerville, Esq., Parents' Rights Are Fundamental, Memo-
randum from the National Center for Home Education (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file with
The National Center For Home Education). The National Center For Home Edu-
cation (P.O. Box 125, Paeonian Springs, VA 22129) is a division of the Home School
Legal Defense Association (HSLDA). Scott Somerville is a staff attorney for
HSLDA. See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827(a) (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-3-207 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-51(1) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.6 (Michie 1995).
320. See Somerville, supra note 319.
321. See supra note 309.
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where the abuse that took place was the result of over zealous
or wrongfully motivated social workers.322
In Parham v. J.R. 323, the Court emphasized the significance
of parental rights.324 Still, "the Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether the right to direct the upbringing and education of
one's children is among those fundamental rights whose in-
fringement merits heightened scrutiny."325 The Court, also con-
cerned with children's well-being, pointed out in Parham326
that:
[a]s with so many other legal presumptions, experience and real-
ity may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the inci-
dence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some
parents "may at times be acting against the interests of their chil-
dren" . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to
discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach
that parents generally do act in the child's best interests .... The
statist notions that governmental power should supersede paren-
tal authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect
children is repugnant to American tradition.327
322. See cases cited supra note 304.
323. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
324. Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization con-
cepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.
Our cases have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long
ago rejected any notion that a child is "the mere creature of the State" and, on the
contrary, asserted that parents generally "have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations." 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1979) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); see
also cases cited supra notes 89, 99, 104, 110.
325. Brown, 68 F.3d at 553; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
326. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). This was a class action suit challenging the basis
upon which parents can recommend children be admitted to a psychiatric hospital
based on a child's constitutional right of liberty. "The class certified by the District
Court... consisted 'of all persons younger than 18 years of age now or hereafter
received by any defendant for observation and diagnosis and/or detained for care
and treatment at any 'facility' within the State of Georgia.'" See id. at 587 n.2.
One of the plaintiffs, J.R., was a child being treated in a Georgia state mental
hospital. See id.. at 587. He had been declared to be a neglected child who had
been removed from his parents by the county when he was three months old. See
id. at 590. He had been placed in seven different foster homes before he was ad-
mitted to Central State Hospital at the age of seven. See id. The admission team
determined that he was borderline retarded, and that he suffered from an "un-
socialized, aggressive reaction of childhood." Parham, 442 U.S. at 590.
327. Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted).
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Yet many state legislatures have been submitting proposals to
amend their state constitutions 328 in order to stem the tide of
government officials who have indeed "discard[ed] wholesale
those pages of human experience that teach that parents gener-
ally do act in the child's best interests."329 The proposals are the
result of a growing outcry from parents who have no recourse as
the state intrudes further and further inside the family. For
example, when a Washington couple grounded their eighth-
grade daughter for trying to smoke marijuana and sleep with
her boyfriend, she objected and summoned the help of Social
Services. 330 The court rescued the girl, and removed her from
her parent's home.331 How can parents exercise their right to
direct the upbringing of their children if every time they make
an unpopular decision it is undermined by an appeal to a local
social worker?
Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child
or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the
power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
officer of the state .... Neither state officials nor federal courts
are equipped to review such parental decisions. 332
Because parental rights and the integrity of the family
were so taken for granted that they were not enumerated in the
Constitution, courts have interpreted those rights differently.
But because they are unenumerated, many courts are hesitant
to overturn legislation that may threaten a constitutional right
that is only implied. In Stanley v. Illinois,333 the United States
Supreme Court held that "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential, basic civil rights of
man,' and are '[r]ights far more precious . . . than property
rights.'" 334 The Court goes on to say that "it is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."335
328. See infra note 338.
329. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03.
330. See In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 770 (1980).
331. See id. at 759.
332. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
333. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
334. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
335. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
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Stanley was a case involving an unwed father trying to regain
custody of his children who were taken from him by the state
when their mother died, despite the fact that he had been in-
volved in raising them for eighteen years.336 This was by no
means the result of a child abuse charge or investigation. The
Court was not in any way dealing with parental rights as it re-
lated to administrative investigations or searches by social
workers. Even though the Court declared in Stanley that "[tihe
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"337 when those pro-
tected rights are "pitted" against the CPS administrative focus,
they are no longer fundamental or protected. 338 It is no surprise
that so many states have attempted to enumerate in their own
state constitutions the right to guide and direct the upbringing
of their children. 339 Clearly, Child Protective Services all across
the country, as well as our own courts, need clear guidelines to
follow that will protect both long established parental rights
and our nation's children from abuse.
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act
A bill that has been recently considered by the United
States House of Representatives and Senate is the Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act [hereinafter, "PRRA"].340 PRRA
336. 405 U.S. at 646.
337. Id. at 651 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
338. See Sex, Lies and County Government: Abuse Case Shows it All, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Jul. 19, 1992, at 4C (describing the findings of a San Diego
grand jury that discovered that family freedoms were violated in over three hun-
dred cases, and that thirty-five to seventy percent of the children who were taken
from their families in San Diego County "should never have been removed from
their parental homes."). See also supra note 78.
339. See, e.g., H.B. 781 (Ala. 1996) (a proposal to amend the Constitution of
Alabama to prohibit the infringement of the right of parents to direct the upbring-
ing and education of their children); H.B. 687 (Haw. 1995) (a bill which gives par-
ents the right to direct the upbringing and education of their children). Similar
measures were introduced in California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington and Wisconsin. See Jonathan Kerr, Conservative Groups Vouch for
'Parental Rights' Bills in Congress, State Legislatures, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, May
13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 265032.
340. The Act was originally introduced into the House of Representatives on
Jun. 28, 1995, by Congressman Steve Largent, See H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. (1995),
and introduced into the Senate on Jun. 29, 1995 by Senator Charles Grassley. See
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§ 984, 104th Cong. (1995). The last action taken was on Jun. 25, 1996 when it was
referred to committee. At that time, it had 139 cosponsors. See id. The Findings
and Purposes section in both the House and Senate version provides:
(a) FINDINGS - Congress finds that - -
(1) The Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children as a fundamental right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty within the 14th Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, as specified in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
(2) the role of parents in the raising and rearing of their children is of
inestimable value and deserving of both praise and protection by all
levels of government;
(3) the tradition of Western civilization recognizes that parents have the
responsibility to love, nurture, train and protect their children;
(4) some decisions of Federal and State courts have treated the right of
parents not as a fundamental right, resulting in an improper stan-
dard of judicial review being applied to government conduct that ad-
versely affects parental rights and prerogatives;
(5) parents face increasing intrusions into their legitimate decisions and
prerogatives by government agencies in situations that do not in-
volve traditional understanding of abuse or neglect but simply are a
conflict of parenting philosophies;
(6) governments should not interfere in the decisions and actions of par-
ents without compelling justification; and
(7) the traditional 4-step process used by courts to evaluate cases con-
cerning the right of parents described in paragraph (1) appropriately
balances the interests of parents, children and government.
(b) PURPOSES - The purposes of this act are -
(1) to protect the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren as a fundamental right;
(2) to protect children from abuse and neglect as the terms have been
traditionally defined and applied in statutory law, such protection
being a compelling governmental interest;
(3) while protecting the rights of parents, to acknowledge that the rights
involve responsibilities and specifically that parents have the re-
sponsibility to see that their children are educated, for the purposes
of literacy and self-sufficiency, as specified by the Supreme Court in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
(4) to preserve the common law tradition that allows parental choices to
prevail in a health care decision for a child, unless by neglect or re-
fusal, the parental decision will result in the danger to the life of the
child or result in serious physical injury of the child;
(5) to fix a standard of judicial review for parental rights, leaving to the
courts the application of the rights in particular cases based on the
facts of the cases and law as applied to the facts; and
(6) to reestablish a 4-step procedure to evaluate cases concerning the
right of parents described in paragraph (1) that -
(A) requires the parent to initially demonstrate that -
(i) the action in question arises from the right of a parent to
direct the upbringing of a child; and
(ii) a government has interfered with or usurped the right; and
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establishes the fundamental right of parents to direct and pro-
vide for the education and religious teaching of their children,
and also addresses health care decisions and reasonable corpo-
ral discipline. 341 PRRA also allows governmental intervention
where a compelling interest exists, but shifts the burden of per-
suasion to the government, which must demonstrate that "the
interference or usurpation is essential to accomplish a compel-
ling governmental interest"342 and that "the method of interven-
tion or usurpation used by the government is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling interest."343
The Act also has specific provisions for child abuse and ne-
glect.34 Those that oppose such a measure believe it would ac-
tually hinder child abuse investigators. 345 Supporters of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,346 for ex-
ample, have adopted a concept that government should "[pro-
tect] children from the power of parents."37 People for the
American Way [hereinafter, "PAW"] commented on the recently
defeated Colorado Constitutional Amendment known as
Amendment 17:348
(B) shifts the burden of production and persuasion to the govern-
ment to demonstrate that -
(i) the interference or usurpation is essential to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest; and
(ii) the method of intervention or usurpation used by the govern-
ment is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the com-
pelling interest.
H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. (1995).
341. See id. at § 3(4)(A), (B).
342. Id. § 2(b)(6).
343. Id. § 2(b)(6)(ii).
344. See id. at §§ 2(b)(4), 3(4)(C).
To preserve the common law tradition that allows parental choices to pre-
vail in a health care decision for a child, unless, by neglect or refusal, the
parental decision will result in danger to the child's life or result in serious
physical injury of the child . . . [tihe term "right of a parent to direct the
upbringing of a child" shall not include a right of a parent to act or refrain
from acting in a manner that constitutes abuse or neglect of a child, as the
terms have traditionally been defined.
H.R. 1946 at § 2(b)(4), 3(4)(C).
345. Kerr, supra note 339.
346. See supra note 141.
347. See supra note 174.
348. See Bal. Meas. No. 7, 60th Gen. Assem. (Col. 1996). Out of the 3,231
precincts reporting, 42.3% or 614,275 voted YES and 57.7% or 836,524 voted NO.
See Colorado 'Parental Rights' Amendment Fails, WEsT's LEGAL NEws, Nov. 7,
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The PRRA was disguised as protecting "parental rights." How-
ever, the amendment would give parents the unqualified right "to
direct and control the upbringing, education, values and disci-
pline of their children." In reality, PRRA would have actually pre-
empted state and local laws that protect children and provide
health and education services. Communities would have been
paralyzed under the threat of lawsuits about virtually all the
services and programs they provide. Child protective services
would be discouraged from investigating reports of abuse, which
could result in more children being placed at risk of harm. Local
decisions between parents and educators about curriculum con-
tent and text book selection could have been overturned, threat-
ening public schools with chaos and encouraging wholesale
censorship of school books by individual right-wing activists.349
The organization then also discusses the PRRA350 indicating
that it is unnecessary, and if enacted, would impair the ability
of CPS to investigate reports of abuse and neglect and to ensure
the safety of children.351
The National Education Association [hereinafter, "NEA"]
described the PRRA as an unprecedented, anti-democratic ef-
fort to impose federal control over local school affairs and
claimed that it is disruptive, intrusive, expensive, unnecessary,
and a measure that will wreak havoc in the public schools. 35 2
In their statement, they pointed out that "the Supreme Court
has never recognized parental rights as fundamental, and the
lower courts consistently have refused to apply a compelling
state interest test to such claims."353 NEA claims that this bill
does not codify existing law; instead, they claim that it creates
1996, available in 1996 WL 638747; see also Jonathan Kerr, Colorado's Parental
Rights Amendment Called Deceptive, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 14, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 584475.
349. People for the American Way, Colorado's 'Parental Rights' Amendment
(Oct. 25, 1996) <http://www.pfaw.org/educa/prraco.htm>.
350. See supra note 323.
351. People for the American Way, Colorado's 'Parental Rights' Amendment
(Oct. 25, 1996) <http://www.pfaw.org/educa/prraco.htm>. See supra notes 48-51
and accompanying text.
352. See Statement of the National Education Association Regarding the Pa-
rental Rights and Responsibilities Act (NEA, Office of the General Counsel) (Febru-
ary 1996).
353. Id.
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a new fundamental right and will have dire consequences for
this country's public schools. 354
In reality, the issue is one of control. In other words, who
will control the nation's children?35 5 The conjectures made by
the NEA and PAW356 have little rational basis. For example,
the authority of local school boards to make decisions concern-
ing curriculum content will not be altered by the PRRA. The
Act may, however, give parents a legal basis for opting their
children out of a particular class considered to be harmful. 357
Local principals and school boards are still in charge of the pub-
lic schools. In his letter to Senator Grassley, James Smith, As-
sociate -Executive Director for Advocacy Services for the Iowa
Education Association, stated "this bill simply allows parents a
greater role in requesting that their children be allowed to opt-
out of activities or assignments that are of a particular concern.
Control over our school districts would still rest where it really
belongs - at the local level."358 Deanna Dubay, Education Direc-
tor of PAW, asserts, however "[i]f you play out the possibilities,
you'd have a situation where school districts have to customize
their entire curriculum and anything the least controversial is
weeded out... [a]nd parents already have rights in these areas.
354. See id. Some of the assumptions that the NEA makes to support this
claim are that the PRRA would force schools to tailor curricula for each student
because the Act requires that every district in the country provide special alterna-
tive curricula that promotes the race, culture, religion or values of individual par-
ents. Moreover, NEA claims that this would actually give certain parents special
rights to make a claim for expanded government benefits, a right that will cost an
enormous amount of money. If one extra teacher, for example, had to be placed in
each school because of the PRRA, it would cost $3,346,330,650 an amount derived
by multiplying the number of public schools in the country (87,110) by the average
teacher's salary in the 1994-95 school year ($38,415). See id.
355. "What remains largely unconfronted is the pervasiveness of value trans-
mission in the schools. In practice, the choice of values to be transmitted lies not
with the child or the child's family, but with the political majority or interest group
in charge of the school system." Scott W. Somerville, Parent's Rights are Funda-
mental, Memorandum from the National Center for Home Education (March 3,
1995) (quoting Stephan Arons and Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of
Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 309, 316 (1980)); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 349, 352.
357. See H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. § 3(4)(a)(i) (1995).
358. James A. Smith, Iowa State Education Association Stands Alone in
Favor of the PRRA, THE HOME SCHOOL REPORT, July-Aug., 1996, 7, 8 (available
from the Home School Legal Defense Association, Paeonian Springs, Va.).
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It's unnecessary."359 She also claims that "[sichools will have to
get back to what some see as the academic basics - no values, no
sex education, just reading, writing, and arithmetic .... [tihe
impossible alternative would be to do a custom-designed curric-
ulum for each child."360 In other words, the choice is either
back to basics, or custom-designed curricula, rather than orga-
nizations like Ms. Duby's and the NEA directing the education
of our nation's children.361 It is not a hard choice to make for a
parent, for a business, for a government, and hopefully, for the
nation's educators.
The National Organization for Women [hereinafter,
"NOW"] claims that the PRRA would undermine laws that al-
low minors to choose "health care services, such as family plan-
ning, abortion .... Further, life saving efforts such as condom
distribution programs to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS could
be halted by the passage of this bill . . . [and] place state and
local officials charged with the public welfare continually on the
defensive."362 In other words, officials would be accountable to
parents, rather than to special interest organizations such as
NOW, PAW, and the NEA. Planned Parenthood warns that
"this bill would generate absolute confusion and chaos across
the country ... endanger[ing] the health of teens afraid of ob-
taining parental consent for health and reproductive services,"
citing a study that found that twenty-five percent of teens
would not seek certain types of health care if there were a possi-
bility that their parents would find out.363
Another contention is that the bill would make it harder to
prevent child abuse. The reality is that the PRRA provides for
"reasonable corporal discipline"364 with absolutely no provision
for child abuse: "The term 'right of a parent to direct the up-
bringing of a child' shall not include a right of a parent to act or
refrain from acting in a manner that constitutes abuse or ne-
359. Kerr, supra note 348.
360. Cover Story, The Enemies of Parental Rights Unite, THE HOME SCHOOL
REPORT, July-Aug. 1996, 4, 5 (available from the Home School Legal Defense Asso-
ciation, Paeonian Springs, Va.).
361. See id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. § 3(4)(A)(iii), (C) (1995).
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glect of a child, as the terms have traditionally been defined."365
But the Children's Defense Fund [hereinafter, "CDF"] believes
otherwise. On July 1, 1996, 200,000 people gathered at a rally
organized by CDF at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington,
D.C. 366 Their banner read "STAND FOR CHILDREN."36 7
Many organizations were represented at the rally. The Revolu-
tionist Communist Progressive Labor Party was passing out
newspapers with headlines that read "CAPITALISM NO
PLACE FOR KIDS" and "CAPITALISM KILLS."368 Bumper
stickers were also being handed out at the rally with slogans
like "earth can no longer afford the rich," "feminism spoken
here," "pro-choice: keep abortion safe and legal."369 Buttons
were also available with titles such as "Lesbian Mom," "We're
here, we're gay, we're in the P.T.A.," "Fundamentalism stops a
thinking mind," "Poverty is violence," and "Unspoken 'tradi-
tional family values': abuse, alcoholism, incest. Break the tra-
dition!"370  According to CDF president Marian Wright
Edleman, those who gathered at the rally were committed "to
building a just America that leaves no child behind," and "to
ensuring all our children have a healthy and a safe passage to
adulthood." 371 Denying that parents have the fundamental
right to direct the upbringing and education of their children,
CDF strongly opposes any parental rights legislation, including
the PRRA.372
Is it any wonder why parents believe they need legislation
in order to be able to continue to direct the education and up-
bringing of their own children? What is fueling so much of the
opposition to the PRRA? If such a bill is so unnecessary, why
are organizations working so hard to prevent it? The Home
School Legal Defense Association 373 believes that the philosoph-
ical underpinning in the movement against parental rights
365. Id. § 3(4)(C).
366. See The Enemies of Parental Rights Unite, supra note 360.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. The Enemies of Parental Rights Unite, supra note 360.
372. See id.
373. The Home School Legal Defense Association is a legal organization that
concentrates on defending home schoolers on any issue relating to a parent's right
to home school their children.
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is the conviction that parents do not know what is best for their
children. This is an out-growth of the belief that individuals do
not know what is best for their lives. Those who oppose the PRRA
believe that the intellectual and political elite know what is best
for everyone, especially children. After all, as Hillary Clinton
tells us, parents alone cannot raise a child, "it takes a village."
Parents should provide food and shelter for children, educators
should teach children, and social workers should check up on eve-
ryone to make sure the best interests of the child are being
served. Parents are one part of the system, but they should not
try to control or override the other "essential" influences in their
children's lives.374
The Supreme Court of Washington, en banc, determined in
In re the Welfare of Sheila Marie Sumey, 375 that
[Ilt is now well established that when parental actions or deci-
sions seriously conflict with the physical or mental health of the
child, the State has a parens patriae right and responsibility to
intervene to protect the child .... Although the family structure
is a fundamental institution of our society, and parental preroga-
tives are entitled to considerable legal deference ... they are not
absolute and must yield to fundamental rights of the child or im-
portant interests of the State.37 6
The problem was that Sheila Marie was a runaway child be-
cause she could not accept the wishes of her parents. The
Supreme Court of Washington decided, along with Social Serv-
ices, that Sheila Marie's desire not to have to deal with her par-
ents' demands was her fundamental right, and that the parents'
intruding upon that right was affecting her physical and mental
health because it would just cause her to run away from
home.3 7 7 The dissent, in examining the grounds for the majority
opinion, explained:
Petitioning juvenile was asked at the court hearing the following:
Q. Could you please tell us why you believe there is a con-
flict in that home?
A. I just feel that there's a communication gap there ...
That is the sum and substance of the petitioner's testimony upon
which she was taken from her parents' custody over their objec-
374. The Enemies of Parental Rights Unite, supra note 360.
375. 94 Wash. 2d 757 (1980); see supra note 330.
376. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
377. See id. at 767-69.
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tions. What standards of conduct had these parents laid down
which led to this "lack of communication"? They asked their 15-
year-old daughter not [to] use drugs, or associate with those who
had furnished the drugs, that she not use alcohol, that she not be
sexually active, and that she be in at a reasonable hour. Because
of the daughter's unwillingness to follow these obviously reason-
able standards, the parents are summarily deprived of custody
and the best opportunity to resolve these problems within the
family. There was no claim or proof of unfitness or neglect by the
parents. There was no claim o[r] proof of any imminent threat of
harm or danger to this 15-year-old. The only manifestation of any
potential harm to the child was her threat to run away. She had
done so once in the past and occasionally stayed overnight with
friends without permission.37 8
Part V - Conclusion
Those most concerned with the welfare and rights of chil-
dren need to be primarily concerned with a system of justice
and laws that guarantees parental rights, for the first right of a
child is to have parents who will love, care and nurture enough
to ensure that the child ends up a healthy and productive child.
"To say that parents have the primary role in raising children is
to say that parents are irreplaceable." 379 If that is what we
378. Id. at 769-70 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). If the State of Missouri had
been able to take children away from their parents when Mormon refugees were
fleeing religious persecution in the East, Utah might never have been settled. See
Somerville, supra note 319, at 7. The Supreme Court of Utah found that family
autonomy was the very thing that helps preserve a diverse society:
[F]amily autonomy helps to assure the diversity characteristic of a free soci-
ety. There is no surer way to preserve pluralism than to allow parents max-
imum latitude in rearing their own children. Much of the rich variety in
American culture has been transmitted from generation to generation by
determined parents who were acting against the best interest of their chil-
dren, as defined by official dogma. Conversely, there is no surer way to
threaten pluralism than to terminate the rights of parents who contradict
officially approved values imposed by reformers empowered to determine
what is in the "best interest" of someone else's child. In Re J.P., 648 P.2d
1364, 1376 (Utah 1982) (holding that the inherent and retained right of a
parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child is constitutionally pro-
tected, and that the welfare of a child is the paramount consideration, but it
is not the sole consideration, to the exclusion of parental rights).
Id.
379. Family Research Council, How Does the FRC View the Rights and Re-
sponsibilities of Parents? <http://www.townhall.com/frc/faq/faql9.html>.
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want to say as a society, parents need the legal and constitu-
tional recognition that will afford them the ability to direct the
upbringing and education of their children. The Court has not
done it, Social Services has not done it, but statutory recogni-
tion of the fundamental rights of parents will enable parents to
make the decisions about child rearing that only they can and
should be making. Without a definitive declaration of what
family rights are in the areas of child rearing, discipline, educa-
tion, and other areas of family life that parents have tradition-
ally directed, the courts will be obliged to resort to balancing
tests and whatever "clearly established" constitutional privi-
leges have been declared when government agencies decide to
impose on those traditions.
Even strong two-parent families require strong communities to
help pattern for children right[s] habits of the heart. When so
many children are languishing without families of their own, com-
munity becomes all the more important .... It's right and fair to
admit that it takes a village, as long as we really mean a local
"village" that preserves parent autonomy, instead of a federal
plantation that chains both children and families to an all-power-
ful state.380
Michael Compitello*
380. Jennifer E. Marshall and Deanna Carlson, The Least of These, FRC
Code: 9V96E4WL, (May 23, 1996) <http://www.frc.org/frc/perspective/
pv96e4wl.html>.
* This article is dedicated to my wife Debbie, for the long and loving sacrifices
she made for our children.
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